带补偿的二元均衡问题的精确解方法及电力市场的提升问题
An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem
摘要:
我们提出了一种新的方法来寻找纳什均衡的游戏与二进制决策变量,包括补偿支付和激励相容性约束,从非合作对策理论直接进入一个优化框架,而不是使用一阶条件的线性化,或放松的完整性条件。重新制定提供了一种新的方法来获得和解释对偶变量的二元约束使用的收益或损失的偏差,而不是边际松弛。该方法内生化整体(社会)效率和补偿支付之间的权衡,以调整个别球员的激励措施。我们提供了存在的结果和条件下,这个问题可以解决作为一个混合二元线性规划。我们应用的解决方案的方法,程式化的节点电力市场的平衡问题与二进制开关的决定。这个说明性的例子表明,我们的方法产生了一个精确解的补偿的二进制纳什博弈。我们比较了不同的实现实际的市场规则在我们的模型中,特别是约束,确保非负利润(无损失规则)和限制的补偿支付给非派遣发电机。我们讨论由此产生的均衡的整体福利,效率和分配公平。
英文摘要:
We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a linearization, or relaxation of integrality conditions. The reformulation offers a new approach to obtain and interpret dual variables to binary constraints using the benefit or loss from deviation rather than marginal relaxations. The method endogenizes the trade-off between overall (societal) efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of individual players. We provide existence results and conditions under which this problem can be solved as a mixed-binary linear program. We apply the solution approach to a stylized nodal power-market equilibrium problem with binary on-off decisions. This illustrative example shows that our approach yields an exact solution to the binary Nash game with compensation. We compare different implementations of actual market rules within our model, in particular constraints ensuring non-negative profits (no-loss rule) and restrictions on the compensation payments to non-dispatched generators. We discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare, efficiency, and allocational equity.
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