The start up costs in many kinds of generators lead to complex cost structures, which in turn yield severe market loopholes in the locational marginal price (LMP) scheme. Convex hull pricing (a.k.a. extended LMP) is proposed to improve the market efficiency by providing the minimal uplift payment to the generators. In this letter, we consider a stylized model where all generators share the same generation capacity. We analyze the generators' possible strategic behaviors in such a setting, and then propose an index for market power quantification in the convex hull pricing schemes.
This paper introduces a computationally efficient comparative approach to classical pricing rules for day-ahead electricity markets, namely Convex Hull Pricing, IP Pricing and European-like market rules, in a Power Exchange setting with non-convex demand bids. These demand bids can, for example, be useful to large industrial consumers, and extend demand block orders in use by European Power Exchanges. For this purpose, we show that Convex Hull Prices can be efficiently computed using continuous relaxations for bidding products involving start-up costs, minimum power output levels and ramp cons…
We consider a general power market with price-sensitive consumer bids and non-convexities originating from supply (start-up and no-load costs, nonzero minimum output limits of generating units, etc.) and demand. The convex hull (minimum-uplift) pricing method produces the set of power prices that minimizes the total uplift payments to the market players needed to compensate their potential profits lost by accepting the centralized dispatch solution. All opportunities to supply (consume) any other output (consumption) volumes allowed by market player individual operational constraints are consi…
In certain electricity markets, because of non-convexities that arise from their operating characteristics, generators that follow the independent system operator's (ISO's) decisions may fail to recover their cost through sales of energy at locational marginal prices. Discriminatory side payments are made by the ISO to incentivize the compliance of generators. Convex hull pricing is a uniform pricing scheme that minimizes these side payments. The Lagrangian dual problem of the unit commitment problem has been used to determine convex hull prices. However, this approach is computationally expen…
The presence of non-convexities in electricity markets has been an active research area for about two decades. The -- inevitable under current marginal cost pricing -- problem of guaranteeing that no market participant incurs losses in the day-ahead market is addressed in current practice through make-whole payments a.k.a. uplift. Alternative pricing rules have been studied to deal with this problem. Among them, Convex Hull (CH) prices associated with minimum uplift have attracted significant attention. Several US Independent System Operators (ISOs) have considered CH prices but resorted to ap…
This paper is concerned with the determination of pricing strategies for a firm that in each period of a finite horizon receives replenishment quantities of a single product which it sells in two markets, e.g., a long-distance market and an on-site market. The key difference between the two markets is that the long-distance market provides for a one period delay in demand fulfillment. In contrast, on-site orders must be filled immediately as the customer is at the physical on-site location. We model the demands in consecutive periods as independent random variables and their distributions depe…
Strategic Pricing in Electricity Markets with Pollution Constraints
Univ. Lille, Inria, CNRS, Centrale Lille（里尔大学、法国国家信息与自动化研究所、法国国家科学研究中心、里尔中央理工学院）；Depto de Ingeniería Matemática and CMM, Universidad de Chile（智利大学数学工程系和CMM）
We develop an option pricing model based on a tug-of-war game. This two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game is formulated in the context of a multi-dimensional financial market. The issuer and the holder try to manipulate asset price processes in order to minimize and maximize the expected discounted reward. We prove that the game has a value and that the value function is the unique viscosity solution to a terminal value problem for a parabolic partial differential equation involving the non-linear and completely degenerate infinity Laplace operator.
This paper presents the results of the Dynamic Pricing Challenge, held on the occasion of the 17th INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Section Conference on June 29-30, 2017 in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. For this challenge, participants submitted algorithms for pricing and demand learning of which the numerical performance was analyzed in simulated market environments. This allows consideration of market dynamics that are not analytically tractable or can not be empirically analyzed due to practical complications. Our findings implicate that the relative performance of algorithms varies su…
Renewable sources are taking center stage in electricity generation. However, matching supply with demand in a renewable-rich system is a difficult task due to the intermittent nature of renewable resources (wind, solar, etc.). As a result, Demand Response (DR) programs are an essential part of the modern grid. An efficient DR technique is to devise different pricing schemes that encourage customers to reduce or shift the electric load. In this paper, we consider a market model for DR using Block Rate Pricing (BRP) of two blocks. We use a utility maximization approach in a competitive market. …
When investors have heterogeneous attitudes towards risk, it is reasonable to assume that each investor has a pricing kernel, and that these individual pricing kernels are aggregated to form a market pricing kernel. The various investors are then buyers or sellers depending on how their individual pricing kernels compare to that of the market. In Brownian-based models, we can represent such heterogeneous attitudes by letting the market price of risk be a random variable, the distribution of which corresponds to the variability of attitude across the market. If the flow of market information is…
Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a widely employed method for pricing electricity in the wholesale electricity market. Although it is well known that the LMP mechanism is vulnerable to market manipulation, there is little literature providing a systematic analysis of this phenomenon. In the first part of this paper, we investigate the economic dispatch outcomes of the LMP mechanism with strategic agents. We show via counterexamples, that contrary to popular belief, a Nash equilibrium may not exist. And when it exists, the price of anarchy may be arbitrarily large. We then provide two suffi…
Recently, chance-constrained stochastic electricity market designs have been proposed to address the shortcomings of scenario-based stochastic market designs. In particular, the use of chance-constrained market-clearing avoids trading off in-expectation and per-scenario characteristics and yields unique energy and reserves prices. However, current formulations rely on symmetric control policies based on the aggregated system imbalance, which restricts balancing reserve providers in their energy and reserve commitments. This paper extends existing chance-constrained market-clearing formulations…
We consider an incomplete multi-asset binomial market model. We prove that for a wide class of contingent claims the extremal multi-step martingale measure is a power of the corresponding single-step extremal martingale measure. This allows for closed form formulas for the bounds of a no-arbitrage contingent claim price interval. We construct a feasible algorithm for computing those boundaries as well as for the corresponding hedging strategies. Our results apply, for example, to European basket call and put options and Asian arithmetic average options.
In an incomplete market setting, we consider two financial agents, who wish to price and trade a non-replicable contingent claim. Assuming that the agents are utility maximizers, we propose a transaction price which is a result of the minimization of a convex combination of their utility differences. We call this price the risk sharing price, we prove its existence for a large family of utility functions and we state some of its properties. As an example, we analyze extensively the case where both agents report exponential utility.
We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers with non-traded random endowments, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for negotiation to be successful, i.e., for the trade to occur. We also study the asymptotic case where the size of the claim is small compared to the random endowments and we give a full characterization in this case. Finally, we study a partial-equilibrium problem for a bundle o…
Stochastic Online Fisher Markets: Static Pricing Limits and Adaptive Enhancements
Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering, Stanford University（斯坦福大学计算与数学工程研究所）；Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University（斯坦福大学管理科学与工程学院）
