分布值博弈--综述、分析和基于分段的方法
Distribution-Valued Games -- Overview, Analysis, and a Segmentation-Based Approach
摘要:
本文[Ras 15 a]介绍了分布值博弈。这个博弈论模型使用概率分布作为博弈的收益,以表达收益的不确定性。玩家对不同收益的偏好由一个随机顺序表示,我们称之为尾序。本文将偏好表示为一般随机序的分布值对策形式化,并具体分析了尾序的性质。给出了尾序偏好成立的充分条件,但也发现[Ras 15 a]中关于尾序的某些论断是不正确的,并构造了反例.特别是,它表明,一个证明的整体的顺序在一定的一组分布包含一个错误;论文继续表明,排序是不全的限制稍少的一组分布与非负有界支持。它还表明,不是所有的尾序博弈有混合策略的纳什均衡,事实上,几乎所有的尾序博弈有限支持的支付分布只能有一个纳什均衡,如果他们有一个纯策略的纳什均衡。本文随后扩展了[AM 19]的思想,并提出了一个新的解决方案的概念,分布值游戏。这个概念是基于构造多目标实值游戏从分布值游戏分割他们的支付分布。
英文摘要:
The paper [Ras15a] introduced distribution-valued games. This game-theoretic model uses probability distributions as payoffs for games in order to express uncertainty about the payoffs. The player's preferences for different payoffs are expressed by a stochastic order which we call the tail order. This thesis formalizes distribution-valued games with preferences expressed by general stochastic orders, and specifically analyzes properties of the tail order. It identifies sufficient conditions for tail-order preference to hold, but also finds that some claims in [Ras15a] about the tail order are incorrect, for which counter-examples are constructed. In particular, it is demonstrated that a proof for the totality of the order on a certain set of distributions contains an error; the thesis proceeds to show that the ordering is not total on the slightly less restricted set of distributions with non-negative bounded support. It is also shown that not all tail-ordered games have mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and in fact almost all tail-ordered games with finitely-supported payoff distributions can only have a Nash equilibrium if they have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The thesis subsequently extends an idea from [AM19] and proposes a new solution concept for distribution-valued games. This concept is based on constructing multi-objective real-valued games from distribution-valued games by segmenting their payoff distributions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。