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arXiv 1102.2716math.OC
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偏序集上的拟Leontief效用函数II:Nash均衡

Quasi-Leontief utility functions on partially ordered sets II: Nash equilibria

Walter Briec, QiBin Liang, Charles Horvath

摘要:

证明了在适当的条件下,具有拟Leontief支付函数$u_i : \prod_{j=1}^nX_j\to\mathbb{R}$的抽象博弈存在纳什均衡。当所有的支付函数都是全局拟Leontief时,有效Nash均衡的存在性和特征主要由第一部分的分析得出。当支付函数分别是拟列昂惕夫函数时,问题就有些复杂了。假设所有的策略空间都是紧的拓扑半格,在支付函数适当的连续条件下,利用Eilenberg-Montgomery不动点定理和拓扑半格的一些非平凡性质,证明了定义在绝对收缩核上的无圈值上连续映射存在有效的Nash均衡.所讨论的映射定义在Nash平衡点集上,并且它的不动点恰好是有效Nash平衡点。

英文摘要:

We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions $u_i : \prod_{j=1}^nX_j\to\mathbb{R}$ has a Nash equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the existence and the characterization of efficient Nash equilibria mainly follows from the analysis carried out in part I. When the payoff functions are individually quasi-Leontief functions the matter is somewhat more complicated. We assume that all the strategy spaces are compact topological semilattices, and under appropriate continuity conditions on the payoff functions, we show that there exists an efficient Nash equilibria using the Eilenberg-Montgomery Fixed Point Theorem for acyclic valued upper semicontinuous maps defined on an absolute retract and some non trivial properties of topological semilattices. The map in question is defined on the set of Nash equilibria and its fixed points are exactly the efficient Nash equilibria.

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