Siyang Xiong
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
继续探索
On Locally Rationalizable Social Choice Functions
本文扩展局部可合理化理论，提出 γ 的强化条件与 γ-包络，以 PIP 传递关系精确刻画该性质，并统一刻画多种经典与新型社会选择函数。
Obviously Strategy-proof Choice of Social Acts
本文在Bahel和Sprumont（2020）提出的社会行为选择框架下，研究显然策略证明实施，并刻画了可通过显然策略证明机制实施的一致社会选择函数类，主要结果表明一致社会选择函数是显然策略证明可实施的当且仅当它是独裁的。
Let V be a finite society whose members express weak orderings (hence also indifference, possibly) about two alternatives. We show a simple representation formula that is valid for all, and only, anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice functions on V . The number of such functions is $2^{n+1}$ if V contains $n$ agents.
Keeping up with "The Joneses" matters. This paper examines a model of reference dependent choice where reference points are determined by social comparisons. An increase in the strength of social comparisons, even by only a few agents, increases consumption and decreases welfare for everyone. Strikingly, a higher marginal cost of consumption can increase welfare. In a labour market, social comparisons with co-workers create a big fish in a small pond effect, inducing incomplete labour market sorting. Further, it is the skilled workers with the weakest social networks who are induced to give up…
Utilitarian Social Choice and Distributional Welfare Analysis
本文提出一种适用于离散选择环境的功利主义社会选择概念，基于个体福利效应的分位数而非平均值，为分配性福利度量提供基础。
The Effects of Social Pressure on Fundamental Choices: Indecisiveness and Deferral
本文提出了一种非标准的模型，探讨社会压力如何影响消费者选择，通过分解决策为两个阶段，揭示犹豫与延后行为对社会造成的损失。
Social choice with transfers
本文研究了在允许代理之间转移的情况下，如何通过Shapley值确定最优的社会选择方案。
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.
Social Choice Rules with Responsibility for Individual Skills
本文针对个体对技能负责的场景，研究社会选择规则，提出能被能力标准化效用向量福利排序合理化的充要条件，进而公理化一类结合能力分配、功利主义和平等主义的新规则，且与经典讨价还价解相关。
Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice Revisited
将Brandt等人（2016）基于分数偏好概型的最大抽签结果转移到标准有限选民模型，并放宽连续性条件至实数概率。
The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
本文研究值域至多为二的不可操纵社会选择函数，提出“特征”概念并给出各类函数形式的统一刻画。
I present an example in which the individuals' preferences are strict orderings, and under the majority rule, a transitive social ordering can be obtained and thus a non-empty choice set can also be obtained. However, the individuals' preferences in that example do not satisfy any conditions (restrictions) of which at least one is required by Inada (1969) for social preference transitivity under the majority rule. Moreover, the considered individuals' preferences satisfy none of the conditions of value restriction (VR), extremal restriction (ER) or limited agreement (LA), some of which is requ…
We study some problems of collective choice when individuals can have expressive preferences, that is, where a decision-maker may care not only about the material benefit from choosing an action but also about some intrinsic morality of the action or whether the action conforms to some identity-marker of the decision-maker. We construct a simple framework for analyzing mechanism design problems with such preferences and present some results focussing on the phenomenon we call "Brexit anomaly". The main findings are that while deterministic mechanisms are quite susceptible to Brexit anomaly, ev…
The Implementability of Liberalism
本研究在无限制域下证明，当至少有三个参与者且结果集规模至少为参与者集两倍时，存在选择自由且纳什可实施的社会选择规则，并构建了直观的纳什实施机制。
Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
本文提出序贯一致同意投票规则，证明其与Moulin的M-获胜联盟规则形式等价，并由此说明该规则可由中立性与防策略性刻画，同时将分析扩展至允许选民无差异的完整偏好域。
Manipulation of social choice correspondences under incomplete information
本文研究了在不完全信息下社会选择对应关系的可操纵性，提出了一种基于扩展规则和信息水平的可操纵性概念，并分析了多种社会选择对应关系的可操纵性属性。
Social Preferences and Deliberately Stochastic Behavior
本研究提出加性扰动效用构成的易处理随机选择模型，基于社会偏好相关成本函数区分随机厌恶不公平与羞耻缓解行为，补充事前事后公平考量的实验证据，拓展刻意随机化动机研究。
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where ex-ante and ex-post efficiency coincide, offer a unifying perspective on the known results, and give several new characterizations. The results have implications for well-studied mechanisms including random serial dictatorship and a number of specific environments, including the dichotomous, single-peaked, and social choice domains.
The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency -- typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents -- due to having access only to limited information about the preferences of the agents. We survey the most significant results of the literature on distortion from the past 15 years, and highlight important open problems and the most promising avenues of ongoing and future work.
Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey
该综述从计算社会选择视角梳理经典与现代受限偏好域的性质及应用，涵盖相关经济学与社会选择文献，重点关注偏好域识别与难计算投票规则的胜者确定算法。
Let $V$ be society whose members express preferences about two alternatives, indifference included. Identifying anonymous binary social choice functions with binary functions $f=f(k,m)$ defined over the integer triangular grid $G=\{(k,m)\in \mathbb{N}_0\times\mathbb{N}_0 : k+m\le |V|\} $, we show that every strategy-proof, anonymous social choice function can be described geometrically by listing, in a sequential manner, groups of segments of G, of equal (maximum possible) length, alternately horizontal and vertical, representative of preference profiles that determine the collective choice of…
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof when there are more than two alternatives. For set-valued SCFs, or so-called social choice correspondences, the situation is less clear. There are miscellaneous - mostly negative - results using a variety of strategyproofness notions and additional requirements. The simple and intuitive notion of Kelly-strategyproofness has turned out to be particularly comp…
Many real-world situations of ethical relevance, in particular those of large-scale social choice such as mitigating climate change, involve not only many agents whose decisions interact in complicated ways, but also various forms of uncertainty, including quantifiable risk and unquantifiable ambiguity. In such problems, an assessment of individual and groupwise moral responsibility for ethically undesired outcomes or their responsibility to avoid such is challenging and prone to the risk of under- or overdetermination of responsibility. In contrast to existing approaches based on strict causa…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked domain, it is known that unanimous and strategy-proof deterministic rules have to be min-max rules and those that also satisfy anonymity have to be median rules. Further, random social choice rules satisfying these properties have been shown to be convex combinations of respective deterministic rules. We non-trivially add to this body of results by including fa…
From the Social Choice Problem to a Collusion-Proof Tendering Mechanism for Dynamic Stochastic Projects
该文针对静态社会选择问题中 AGV 机制的缺陷，提出可转移效用保障效用机制（TU-GUM），其适用于动态随机项目且具防合谋性，还总结关联相关成果并补充新观察。
Decades of research suggest that information exchange in groups and organizations can reliably improve judgment accuracy in tasks such as financial forecasting, market research, and medical decision-making. However, we show that improving the accuracy of numeric estimates does not necessarily improve the accuracy of decisions. For binary choice judgments, also known as classification tasks--e.g. yes/no or build/buy decisions--social influence is most likely to grow the majority vote share, regardless of the accuracy of that opinion. As a result, initially inaccurate groups become increasingly …
Risk-minimizing GUE-implementations of truthful reporting in a Dynamic Social Choice Problem
本文发现保证效用机制（GUM）与风险最小化存在新联系，在动态社会选择问题中，对称化GUM及其变体分别最小化效用方差和转移风险，并证明了唯一性条件。
扫码添加微信好友，提出您的宝贵建议 👇
💡 备注请填写：网站反馈
发表机构由 AI 从论文文本抽取，如发现错误，欢迎反馈修正建议。