二值防策略社会选择的结构函数具有无差异性
The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
摘要：
我们给出了一个结构定理的所有联盟战略证明社会选择功能，其范围是一个子集的基数2的一个给定的较大的一组选择。我们提供的情况下，选民/代理人被允许表达冷漠和域由配置文件的偏好超过任意基数的社会。该定理以表示公式的形式出现，可以用来构造所有的函数。
英文摘要：
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
