Anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice

两个备选方案之间不可操纵集体选择的特征

The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives

本文研究值域至多为二的不可操纵社会选择函数，提出“特征”概念并给出各类函数形式的统一刻画。

可数无限社会中联盟策略性防操纵的匿名二元社会选择

Coalition strategy-proof anonymous binary social choice in a countably infinite society

本文刻画可数无限社会中匿名联盟策略性防操纵的二元社会选择函数，证明其等价于三角网格上的超序闭子集，并给出含缺失边界角点的几何分类与四种广义锯齿参数化形式。

Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof

Let $V$ be society whose members express preferences about two alternatives, indifference included. Identifying anonymous binary social choice functions with binary functions $f=f(k,m)$ defined over the integer triangular grid $G=\{(k,m)\in \mathbb{N}_0\times\mathbb{N}_0 : k+m\le |V|\} $, we show that every strategy-proof, anonymous social choice function can be described geometrically by listing, in a sequential manner, groups of segments of G, of equal (maximum possible) length, alternately horizontal and vertical, representative of preference profiles that determine the collective choice of…

主观期望效用偏好下的匿名且防策略投票

Anonymous and Strategy-Proof Voting under Subjective Expected Utility Preferences

本文在主观期望效用框架下刻画了同时满足匿名性、防策略性和范围一致性的社会选择函数，证明其可分解为常值或四种基本类型之一的二元投票规则。

异质社会中的匿名投票

Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society

本文研究二元社会选择中的匿名投票机制设计，发现两智能体下序数多数规则最大化预期福利，而三智能体及以上时基数机制可优于序数机制。

弱偏好域上聚合的一个拓扑条件

A Topological Condition for Aggregation on Weak Preference Domains

本文通过偏好复形与面单调性提出拓扑条件，证明一致、匿名且面单调的社会福利函数存在时序复形连通分量可缩，并应用于固定极值域与单峰域。