This study proposes a tractable stochastic choice model to identify motivations for prosocial behavior, and to explore alternative motivations of deliberate randomization beyond ex-ante fairness concerns. To represent social preferences, we employ an additively perturbed utility model consisting of the sum of expected utility and a nonlinear cost function, where the utility function is purely selfish while the cost function depends on social preferences. Using the cost function, we study stochastic choice patterns to distinguish between stochastic inequity-averse behavior and stochastic shame-mitigating behavior. Moreover, we discuss how our model can complement recent experimental evidence of ex-post and ex-ante fairness concerns.
GATE Lyon–St-Étienne, Université Jean Monnet(里昂-圣艾蒂安GATE实验室,让·莫内大学);Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET(圣路易斯应用数学研究所,圣路易斯国立大学和阿根廷国家科学研究委员会)
Why Efficient Reforms Fail: Endogenous Game Transformation under Status Quo Bias and Social Preferences
semnan.ac.ir(塞姆南大学)
本文研究了为何社会在认识到更优制度时仍停留在劣质制度中,通过建立一个模型,其中参与者不仅选择游戏中的行动,还选择游戏本身的转变。转变可以是软的,通过税收或补贴改变收益,或硬的,通过删除或替换行动改变可行性。在存在现状偏见(转换成本)和有限理性行为(logit量响应)的协调模型中,研究显示这些干预措施有本质差异:有限的税收能连续改变行为但无法消除对继承行动的残余使用,而删除则通过移除行动从可行集来克服惯性。进一步分析了元层面对抗性社会偏好如何阻止对每个玩家都有利的改革。该框架为在惯性下硬可行性限制通常主导软价格激励提供了正式理由,并直接应用于气候转型(碳税 vs. 石油燃料淘汰)和平台监管(罚款 vs. 删除成瘾功能)等领域。
The Non-Orientable Topology of Condorcet's Paradox
The Centre for Complex Systems, University of Sydney(悉尼大学复杂系统中心);School of Computer Science, Faculty of Engineering, University of Sydney(悉尼大学工程学院计算机学院);Faculty of Computer Science, Chennai Mathematical Institute(金奈数学研究所计算机学院)