信念平均相对功利主义

摘要：

在Savage的传统中，我们考虑了当个体和社会的偏好最大化主观期望效用时的社会福利函数。一个系统的公理介绍其唯一的解决方案是社会福利函数，平均代理人的信念和总结他们的效用函数，规范化具有相同的范围。第一个区别公理要求社会的偏好与行为人的偏好之间存在积极的关联，行为人的偏好与信念一致。第二个是削弱了阿罗对不相关替代方案的独立性，这些替代方案仅适用于非冗余行为。

英文摘要：

We consider social welfare functions when the preferences of individual agents and society maximize subjective expected utility in the tradition of Savage. A system of axioms is introduced whose unique solution is the social welfare function that averages the agents' beliefs and sums up their utility functions, normalized to have the same range. The first distinguishing axiom requires positive association of society's preferences with the agents' preferences for acts about which beliefs agree. The second is a weakening of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives that only applies to non-redundant acts.

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