组织中社会规范与激励机制的相互作用
Interactions between social norms and incentive mechanisms in organizations
摘要:
我们关注的是,在具有多个分布式决策代理的组织中,符合社会规范的个人行为如何干扰基于绩效的激励机制。我们对社会规范进行建模,以从代理之间的交互中产生:代理观察其他代理的行为,并从这些观察中归纳出社会可接受的行为。通过遵守诱导的社会接受的行为,代理体验效用。此外,代理人从按业绩计薪的激励机制中获得效用。因此,代理人追求两个目标。我们把社会规范和基于绩效的激励机制之间的相互作用,在一个复杂的环境中的组织与分布式的决策者,其中一组相互依赖的任务被分配给多个代理。结果表明,除非分配的任务集是高度相关的,遵守紧急社会接受的行为是有害的组织的业绩。然而,我们发现,激励计划可以帮助抵消性能损失,应用基于个人的激励在环境中具有较低的任务复杂性和基于团队的激励在环境中具有较高的任务复杂性。
英文摘要:
We focus on how individual behavior that complies with social norms interferes with performance-based incentive mechanisms in organizations with multiple distributed decision-making agents. We model social norms to emerge from interactions between agents: agents observe other the agents' actions and, from these observations, induce what kind of behavior is socially acceptable. By complying with the induced socially accepted behavior, agents experience utility. Also, agents get utility from a pay-for-performance incentive mechanism. Thus, agents pursue two objectives. We place the interaction between social norms and performance-based incentive mechanisms in the complex environment of an organization with distributed decision-makers, in which a set of interdependent tasks is allocated to multiple agents. The results suggest that, unless the sets of assigned tasks are highly correlated, complying with emergent socially accepted behavior is detrimental to the organization's performance. However, we find that incentive schemes can help offset the performance loss by applying individual-based incentives in environments with lower task-complexity and team-based incentives in environments with higher task-complexity.
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