自下而上任务分配的组织设计:激励的作用
Designing organizations for bottom-up task allocation: The role of incentives
摘要:
近年来,各种分散的组织形式出现,对组织设计提出了挑战。一些设计元素,如任务分配,成为紧急属性,不能从上到下完全控制。在这种情况下出现的中心问题是:自下而上的任务分配如何被引导到一个有效的组织结构?为了解决这个问题,本文提出了一种新的基于代理的组织模型,该模型具有自下而上的任务分配,可以由代理方的长期或短期导向来激励。该模型还包括一个激励机制,以指导自下而上的任务分配过程,并创建从利他主义到个人主义的激励机制。我们的分析表明,当自下而上的任务分配是由短期导向驱动,并与激励机制一致,它会导致改善组织绩效,超过传统设计的组织。此外,我们发现,利他激励机制的存在,在组织内减少镜像任务分配的重要性。
英文摘要:
In recent years, various decentralized organizational forms have emerged, posing a challenge for organizational design. Some design elements, such as task allocation, become emergent properties that cannot be fully controlled from the top down. The central question that arises in this context is: How can bottom-up task allocation be guided towards an effective organizational structure? To address this question, this paper presents a novel agent-based model of an organization that features bottom-up task allocation that can be motivated by either long-term or short-term orientation on the agents' side. The model also includes an incentive mechanism to guide the bottom-up task allocation process and create incentives that range from altruistic to individualistic. Our analysis shows that when bottom-up task allocation is driven by short-term orientation and aligned with the incentive mechanisms, it leads to improved organizational performance that surpasses that of traditionally designed organizations. Additionally, we find that the presence of altruistic incentive mechanisms within the organization reduces the importance of mirroring in task allocation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。