发表机构
Transparency Lab Research Institute（透明实验室研究院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文提出组织内部结构性低效率理论，指出内部外部性导致的努力抵消形成绩效上限，并证明在现实条件下结构性低效率主导配置性低效率。
AI 中文摘要
组织在激励制度、治理结构、绩效衡量、分析工具以及反复重组等内部机制上投入了大量资源。然而，实际取得的绩效提升往往微弱或短暂，尤其是在大型和成熟的组织中。标准的解释强调由激励错位、信息问题或有限理性引起的配置性低效率。尽管这些解释有其相关性，但它们难以解释那些努力程度高、优化能力复杂、而总体绩效仍远低于表面潜力的环境。本文提出了组织内部结构性低效率的理论。核心机制是内部外部性的存在：组织机制同时作用于多个绩效目标时产生的未定价的交叉效应。当这些效应的符号混合时，组织努力在内部被部分抵消，形成实际绩效的结构性上限。本文引入了一个组织原始要素和关键绩效指标的简单表示，并推导出一个实际绩效定律，其中内部冲突以乘法折扣因子的形式进入。在弱且现实的条件下，结构性低效率主导配置性低效率，这解释了为什么在组织一致性恢复之前，优化往往失败。
英文摘要
Organizations invest heavily in internal mechanisms such as incentive systems, governance structures, performance measurement, analytics, and repeated reorganizations. Yet realized performance gains are often weak or short-lived, particularly in large and mature organizations. Standard explanations emphasize allocative inefficiency arising from incentive misalignment, information problems, or bounded rationality. While relevant, these explanations struggle to account for environments in which effort is high, optimization capabilities are sophisticated, and aggregate performance remains far below apparent potential. This paper develops a theory of structural inefficiency inside organizations. The central mechanism is the presence of internal externalities: unpriced cross-effects of organizational mechanisms acting simultaneously on multiple performance objectives. When such effects are mixed in sign, organizational effort is partially canceled internally, creating a structural ceiling on realized performance. The paper introduces a simple representation of organizational primitives and key performance indicators and derives a realized-performance law in which internal conflict enters as a multiplicative discount factor. Under weak and realistic conditions, structural inefficiency dominates allocative inefficiency, explaining why optimization often fails before organizational coherence is restored.
Comments51 pages
