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arXiv 2105.04514econ.GNcs.MAnlin.AOq-fin.EC
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论激励在组织设计进化方法中的作用

On the Role of Incentives in Evolutionary Approaches to Organizational Design

Stephan Leitner

摘要:

本文介绍了一个程式化的组织模型,它是由几个部门,自主分配任务。为此,各部门要么采取短视的决定,立即最大限度地提高其效用,要么采取长远的决定,旨在最大限度地减少任务之间的相互依赖性。组织通过个人主义的、平衡的或利他主义的线性激励方案来指导部门的行为。即使任务是完全可分解的,利他主义的激励计划优于个人主义的激励计划,因为它们大大提高了组织的业绩。有趣的是,如果利他主义的激励机制是有效的,短视的决定似乎是有利的,因为它们不仅在短期内提高性能,而且在长期内也会导致显着更高的性能。

英文摘要:

This paper introduces a model of a stylized organization that is comprised of several departments that autonomously allocate tasks. To do so, the departments either take short-sighted decisions that immediately maximize their utility or take long-sighted decisions that aim at minimizing the interdependencies between tasks. The organization guides the departments' behavior by either an individualistic, a balanced, or an altruistic linear incentive scheme. Even if tasks are perfectly decomposable, altruistic incentive schemes are preferred over individualistic incentive schemes since they substantially increase the organization's performance. Interestingly, if altruistic incentive schemes are effective, short-sighted decisions appear favorable since they do not only increase performance in the short run but also result in significantly higher performances in the long run.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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