组织中的未定价内部外部性与结构性低效率
Unpriced Internal Externalities and Structural Inefficiency in Organizations
- Transparency Lab Research Institute（透明实验室研究所）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
AI总结：
本文提出内部外部性概念，解释组织改进内部机制却绩效提升有限的现象，并指出内部冲突构成结构性低效率，需先于优化解决。
AI中文摘要：
组织往往在改善内部机制（如流程、治理和技术）方面投入大量精力，然而却只能实现适度的绩效提升。本文为这一现象提出了一个结构性解释。我们引入了内部外部性的概念：由内部组织机制产生的、同时作用于多个目标的未定价交叉效应。当这些效应相互对立时，努力会在内部相互抵消，即使在不存在激励错位或信息约束的情况下，也会限制可达到的绩效。我们通过将内部机制建模为在绩效目标上施加带符号效应的原始要素，来形式化这一机制。这种结构产生了内部冲突，这是一个可测量的属性，它捕捉了因抵消而损失的组织活动比例。我们表明，冲突构成了一种结构性低效率，它限制了努力的回报，并使配置优化在未首先解决冲突之前变得无效。该框架意味着干预措施的自然排序，即结构清理先于努力重新分配和优化。该分析为组织应如何扩展、约束、重新设计或降低内部机制的优先级提供了可检验的预测和治理启示。
英文摘要：
Organizations often invest substantial effort in improving internal mechanisms such as processes, governance, and technology, yet realize only modest performance gains. This paper proposes a structural explanation for this pattern. We introduce the concept of internal externalities: unpriced cross-effects generated by internal organizational mechanisms that act simultaneously on multiple objectives. When these effects oppose one another, effort cancels internally, limiting attainable performance even without incentive misalignment or informational constraints. We formalize this mechanism by modeling internal mechanisms as primitives that exert signed effects across performance objectives. This structure gives rise to internal conflict, a measurable property that captures the fraction of organizational activity lost to cancellation. We show that conflict constitutes a form of structural inefficiency that constrains the returns to effort and renders allocative optimization ineffective unless addressed first. The framework implies a natural sequencing of interventions, in which structural cleanup precedes effort reallocation and optimization. The analysis yields testable predictions and governance implications for how organizations should scale, constrain, redesign, or deprioritize internal mechanisms.
