组织中的人才囤积
Talent Hoarding in Organizations
AI总结:
本文首次实证发现管理者因团队绩效激励而囤积人才,该行为普遍存在且受绩效薪酬、团队规模和人才可见度影响,并会抑制员工内部流动与职业发展。
摘要:
大多数组织依赖管理者识别有才能的员工。然而,以团队绩效为考核标准的管理者有动机囤积人才。本研究利用一家大型企业的人事记录和调查证据,首次提供了人才囤积的经验证据。四分之三的管理者自我报告存在人才囤积行为,这种行为可在管理者对员工才能的评分中被识别,并且在更强的囤积激励下发生得更为频繁,这些激励以绩效薪酬、团队规模和人才可见度作为代理变量。利用准随机的人才囤积暴露,我表明囤积会抑制内部职位申请,阻碍职业发展,并改变企业内的人才配置。
英文摘要:
Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。