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arXiv 2308.10046econ.GNq-fin.EC
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初创企业收购:人才收购(Acquihires)与人才囤积

Startup Acquisitions: Acquihires and Talent Hoarding

Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina, Shuo Liu

AI总结:

本文构建双竞争企业可收购正交市场初创企业的模型,证明无利可图的 acquihire 也可能是先发制人的人才囤积,造成人才错配、消费者剩余下降与员工工作波动加剧。

摘要:

我们研究竞争力量如何驱使企业低效地收购初创企业人才。在我们的模型中,两家竞争企业均有能力收购并整合一家在正交市场运营的初创企业。我们表明,企业可能主要将此类 acquihires(人才收购)作为一种先发制人策略,即使这些收购单独看来无利可图。因此,即便不存在传统的削弱竞争效应,人才收购也并非无害,因为它们会导致低效的人才配置。此外,我们的分析强调,此类人才囤积会减少消费者剩余,并加剧被人才收购员工的工作波动性。

英文摘要:

We study how competitive forces may drive firms to inefficiently acquire startup talent. In our model, two rival firms have the capacity to acquire and integrate a startup operating in an orthogonal market. We show that firms may pursue such acquihires primarily as a preemptive strategy, even when they appear unprofitable in isolation. Thus, acquihires, even absent traditional competition-reducing effects, need not be benign, as they can lead to inefficient talent allocation. Additionally, our analysis underscores that such talent hoarding can diminish consumer surplus and exacerbate job volatility for acquihired employees.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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