决策者分散的团队中社会规范对绩效的影响
On the effect of social norms on performance in teams with distributed decision makers
摘要:
社会规范是社会中作为主体之间信息交换的结果而出现的预期行为的规则和标准。本文研究了突发性社会规范对团队绩效的影响。我们使用NK框架来构建一个基于代理的模型,在该模型中,代理在一组相互依赖的任务上工作,并与同行交换有关其过去行为的信息。社会规范产生于这些互动。我们发现,社会规范来的整体性能的成本,除非分配给团队成员的任务是高度相关的,效果更强,当代理人分享更多的任务信息,但不变的代理人与更多的同行沟通。最后,我们发现,既定的发现,以团队为基础的激励计划,提高性能的高度复杂的任务仍然存在的社会规范。
英文摘要:
Social norms are rules and standards of expected behavior that emerge in societies as a result of information exchange between agents. This paper studies the effects of emergent social norms on the performance of teams. We use the NK-framework to build an agent-based model, in which agents work on a set of interdependent tasks and exchange information regarding their past behavior with their peers. Social norms emerge from these interactions. We find that social norms come at a cost for the overall performance, unless tasks assigned to the team members are highly correlated, and the effect is stronger when agents share information regarding more tasks, but is unchanged when agents communicate with more peers. Finally, we find that the established finding that the team-based incentive schemes improve performance for highly complex tasks still holds in presence of social norms.
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