RTO Frequency Regulation Market Clearing Formulations and the Effect of Opportunity Costs on Electricity Prices
Adria E. Brooks, Bernard C. Lesieutre
备注：
5 pages, 1 figure; This work accompanies the Review of Frequency Regulation Markets published by the authors in The Electricity Journal in December 2019, found here https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.106668
The Regional Transmission Operators each have unique methods to procure frequency regulation reserves used to track real power fluctuations on the grid. Some market clearing practices result in high regulation prices with large spread compared to other markets. We present the frequency regulation market clearing formulations--as derived from operator tariffs--of the ISO New England, PJM Interconnection, and Midcontinent ISO. We offer test case examples to explain the historic market pricing behavior seen within each system operator and conclude this behavior is due to the inclusion of estimated lost opportunity costs in market clearing.
The implementation of electricity markets based on locational marginal pricing in a multi-settlement process has allowed wholesale competition, with pricing mechanisms that incentivize the optimal allocation of generation, transmission, and demand-response resources. While efficiency and reliability gains have been achieved in the US at a regional level, the lack of adequate inter-regional coordination mechanisms has limited broader gains. The shortcomings of cross-border coordination of electricity markets become more apparent as the industry transitions towards higher penetration of renewabl…
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The proposed open-source Power Market Tool (POMATO) aims to enable research on interconnected modern and future electricity markets in the context of the physical transmission system and its secure operation. POMATO has been designed to study capacity allocation and congestion management (CACM) policies of European zonal electricity markets, especially flow-based market coupling (FBMC). For this purpose, POMATO implements methods for the analysis of simultaneous zonal market clearing, nodal (N-k secure) power flow computation for capacity allocation, and multi-stage market clearing with adapti…
Recently, chance-constrained stochastic electricity market designs have been proposed to address the shortcomings of scenario-based stochastic market designs. In particular, the use of chance-constrained market-clearing avoids trading off in-expectation and per-scenario characteristics and yields unique energy and reserves prices. However, current formulations rely on symmetric control policies based on the aggregated system imbalance, which restricts balancing reserve providers in their energy and reserve commitments. This paper extends existing chance-constrained market-clearing formulations…
University of Arizona（亚利桑那大学）；New York University（纽约大学）
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Strategic Spatial Load Shifting and Market Efficiency
Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, MIT（麻省理工学院信息与决策系统实验室）；MIT Energy Initiative, MIT（麻省理工学院能源倡议）；Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison（威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校电气与计算机工程系）
Improving Sequential Market Coordination via Value-oriented Renewable Energy Forecasting
College of Engineering, Cornell University（康奈尔大学工程学院）；Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, San Diego（加州大学圣地亚哥分校电气与计算机工程系）；Department of Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University（上海交通大学电气工程系）；Dyson School of Design Engineering, Imperial College London（伦敦帝国理工学院设计工程学院）
We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local renewable generation in consideration. We model the interactions among utilities as a non-cooperative game, in which each utility aims at minimizing its per-unit electricity cost. We investigate utilities' optimal bidding strategies and show that all utilities bidding according to (net load) prediction is a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with two salient…
A rapidly changing electricity sector requires adjusted and new ancillary services, which enable the secure and reliable operation of the electricity system. However, assessments and policy advice regarding ancillary services and market design lack methods to evaluate the complex interaction of markets and services. Therefore, this paper contributes an open-source agent-based model to test design options for ancillary services and electricity markets. The Ancillary Services Acquisition Model (ASAM) combines the agent-based modeling framework MESA with the toolbox Python for Power System Analys…
A Fair, Flexible, Zero-Waste Digital Electricity Market: A First-Principles Approach Combining Automatic Market Making, Holarchic Architectures and Shapley Theory
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