基于约束绑定模式存储的电力网络战略操纵
Extended Version: Storage-Based Strategic Manipulation of Constraint-Binding Patterns in Power Networks
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文研究垄断储能聚合商在日前市场中的战略投标，通过Stackelberg博弈和约束绑定模式分解揭示其操纵行为，并提出两种机制以缓解福利损失。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
本文研究了垄断性储能聚合商（ESA）在日前电力市场中的战略性市场参与行为。该聚合商协调地理上分布的储能单元，为其投资组合提交协调投标，并可能持有金融输电权（FTRs）。系统运营商通过考虑网络约束的多时段经济调度来出清市场，确定发电和负荷调度计划、节点电价、能源市场支付以及金融输电权收益。我们将聚合商与系统运营商之间的互动建模为Stackelberg博弈，并通过市场出清问题的约束绑定模式分解来刻画其均衡。该框架不仅支持均衡计算，还揭示了聚合商如何通过战略性地诱导或避免特定的约束绑定模式来增加利润。此外，该框架还建立了一个新颖的福利结果：尽管已知无金融输电权的战略储能相对于无储能情形能弱改善社会福利，但某些金融输电权头寸可以通过增强聚合商诱导特定模式的激励来推翻这一保证，导致社会福利降至无储能水平以下。基于这些发现，我们开发了两种系统运营商机制，以限制不良聚合商行为及其对市场结果和社会福利的不利影响。最后，一个三节点算例说明了理论发现，而IEEE测试系统则证明了所提方法的可扩展性。
英文摘要
This paper studies the strategic market participation of a monopolistic energy storage aggregator (ESA) in a day-ahead electricity market. The ESA coordinates geographically distributed storage units, submits a coordinated bid for its portfolio, and may hold financial transmission rights (FTRs). The system operator clears the market through a network-constrained, multi-period economic dispatch, determining generation and load schedules, nodal prices, energy-market payments, and FTR payoffs. We formulate the ESA--system-operator interaction as a Stackelberg game and characterize its equilibrium through a constraint-binding-pattern decomposition of the market-clearing problem. Beyond enabling equilibrium computation, the framework reveals how the ESA can increase its profit by strategically inducing or avoiding particular constraint-binding patterns. It also establishes a novel welfare result: although strategic storage without FTRs is known to weakly improve social welfare relative to the no-storage case, certain FTR positions can overturn this guarantee by strengthening the ESA's incentive to induce particular patterns, causing social welfare to fall below the no-storage level. Motivated by these findings, we develop two system-operator mechanisms for limiting undesirable ESA behavior and its adverse effects on market outcomes and social welfare. Finally, a three-bus study illustrates the theoretical findings, while IEEE test systems demonstrate the scalability of the proposed method.
发表机构
- Elmore School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University（普渡大学埃尔莫尔电气与计算机工程学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
