用于可再生发电容量高效投资的税收-补贴方案
A Tax-Subsidy Scheme for Efficient Investment in Renewable Generation Capacity
AI总结：
本文针对电力市场的负外部性与可再生能源投资策略性问题，提出庇古税及与消费者剩余贡献挂钩的补贴方案，可激励发电商投资社会最优发电容量且不增加监管信息负担。
摘要：
能源生产的影响显著关乎系统可持续性，这推动了向可再生能源的转型，因此发电商行为对电力市场实现可持续目标至关重要。本文针对电力市场与发电投资的两大关键挑战展开研究：其一，电力市场通常采用竞争性市场出清与按优先级调度模式，该模式忽略了污染带来的负外部性，为此本文提出一种庇古税，以探究这些外部性对电价的影响并解决该问题；其二，可再生能源具有低运营成本的特点，会导致系统电价降低、发电商利润减少，且发电商进入可再生能源领域需承担高额投资成本，进而引发策略性投资决策，为缓解此类策略性行为，本文提出与发电商对消费者剩余贡献额相等的补贴，此类补贴可激励发电商降低电价、提升消费者剩余，从而促使发电商投资于社会最优发电容量；最后，本文证明，实施所提税收与补贴方案不会增加监管者的信息负担。
英文摘要：
The impact of energy production significantly affects system sustainability, which has enabled a shift towards renewable energy sources. Thus, producer behavior is crucial in electricity markets to achieve sustainability goals. In this paper, we address two key challenges comprising electricity markets and generation investment. Firstly, electricity markets typically are operated with competitive market clearing and merit-order dispatch, which neglects negative externalities from pollution. A Pigouvian tax is proposed in order to investigate the impacts of these externalities on electricity prices and resolve this issue. Secondly, renewable energy sources entail low operational costs, which result in lower system prices and reduced profits for producers. Furthermore, producers face high investment costs when moving into renewable energy resources, which leads to strategic investment decisions. In order to mitigate this strategic behavior, subsidies are proposed equal to producers' contribution to consumer surplus. These subsidies incentivize producers to decrease prices and increase consumer surplus, so, producers would be motivated to invest in socially optimal generation capacity. Finally, we demonstrate that implementing the proposed tax and subsidy does not increase the regulator's information burden.
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