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arXiv 1807.01735q-bio.PE
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具有环境反馈的非对称进化博弈

Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

Christoph Hauert, Camille Saade, Alex McAvoy

摘要:

演化博弈论中的模型传统上假设同质环境中的对称交互。在这里,我们考虑在异质环境中进化的种群,该环境由不同质量的补丁组成,每个补丁由一个个体占据。个体的适应性不仅取决于与他人的互动,还取决于环境质量。这种异质性导致不对称的相互作用,其中相互作用的特征可能取决于个体的位置。有趣的是,在非变化的异质环境中,长期动态与平均均匀环境中的对称相互作用相同。然而,在个体的策略和斑块质量之间引入环境反馈会产生丰富的生态演化动力学。因此,每个人都是生态系统工程师。反馈的性质和生态变化的速率可以缓解或加剧社会困境,并促进战略丰度和环境质量的持续周期性振荡。

英文摘要:

Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are occupied by one individual each. The fitness of individuals is not only determined by interactions with others but also by environmental quality. This heterogeneity results in asymmetric interactions where the characteristics of the interaction may depend on an individual's location. Interestingly, in non-varying heterogeneous environments, the long-term dynamics are the same as for symmetric interactions in an average, homogeneous environment. However, introducing environmental feedback between an individual's strategy and the quality of its patch results in rich eco-evolutionary dynamics. Thus, individuals act as ecosystem engineers. The nature of the feedback and the rate of ecological changes can relax or aggravate social dilemmas and promote persistent periodic oscillations of strategy abundance and environmental quality.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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