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arXiv 1610.02787cs.GT
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最佳-最差投票规则下的选举竞争

Electoral Competition under Best-Worst Voting Rules

Dodge Cahan, Arkadii Slinko

摘要:

我们在Hotelling-Downs空间选举模型中研究了最佳-最差投票规则类的多候选人纯策略均衡,其中每个投票者都被赋予了一张赞成票和一张反对票,即,每个选民都可以投票支持一名候选人,反对另一名候选人。在计算候选人的净得分时,对赞成票和反对票的加权可能不同,因此反对票和赞成票不需要完全抵消。这些规则结合了第一位寻求激励的多元化和激励,以避免被排名最后的反多元化。我们表明,这些规则一般承认均衡,这是不收敛的,当且仅当一个积极的投票的重要性超过了一个消极的投票。后一种情况下的均衡集合与多数均衡非常相似,只是由于反对票的调节作用,平台不那么极端。此外,对于权重的正确选择,可以获得在一个极端处的多个和在另一极端处的完全收敛之间的任何程度的分散。

英文摘要:

We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each voter can vote in favour of one candidate and against another one. The weights attached to positive and negative votes in calculating a candidate's net score may be different, so that a negative vote and a positive vote need not cancel out exactly. These rules combine the first-place seeking incentives of plurality with the incentives to avoid being ranked last of anti-plurality. We show that these rules generally admit equilibria, which are nonconvergent if and only if the importance of a positive vote exceeds that of a negative vote. The set of equilibria in the latter case is very similar to that of plurality, except that the platforms are less extreme due to the moderating effect of negative votes. Moreover, any degree of dispersion between plurality, at one extreme, and full convergence, at the other, can be attained for the correct choice of the weights.

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