投票授权和不当行为
Vote Delegation and Misbehavior
摘要：
我们研究了具有“行为良好”和“行为不端”代理的投票委托，并将其与传统投票进行了比较。投票授权的典型例子是区块链上的验证或治理任务。大多数行为良好的代理人，但他们可能会弃权或委托其他代理人投票，因为投票是昂贵的。行为不端的探员总是投票。我们比较了允许弃权的传统投票与投票授权。选民的偏好是私人信息，如果行为良好的代理人获胜，则会取得积极的结果。我们说明，投票授权导致相当不同的结果比传统的投票与弃权。特别是，我们得到三个见解：第一，如果行为不端的选民，表示为f，是高的，这两种投票方法未能提供一个积极的结果。其次，如果f取一个中间值，传统投票会产生积极的结果，而投票授权失败的概率为1。第三，如果f值较低，授权投票比传统投票产生积极结果的概率更高。最后，我们的研究结果描述了流动民主中可能发生的最坏情况。
英文摘要：
We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance tasks on blockchains. There is a majority of well-behaving agents, but they may abstain or delegate their vote to other agents since voting is costly. Misbehaving agents always vote. We compare conventional voting allowing for abstention with vote delegation. Preferences of voters are private information and a positive outcome is achieved if well-behaving agents win. We illustrate that vote delegation leads to quite different outcomes than conventional voting with abstention. In particular, we obtain three insights: First, if the number of misbehaving voters, denoted by f , is high, both voting methods fail to deliver a positive outcome. Second, if f takes an intermediate value, conventional voting delivers a positive outcome, while vote delegation fails with probability one. Third, if f is low, delegation delivers a positive outcome with higher probability than conventional voting. Finally, our results characterize worst-case outcomes that can happen in a liquid democracy.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
