arXiv 1802.080202018-02cs.MAcs.GT

On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy

Daan Bloembergen, Davide Grossi, Martin Lackner

备注：: 17 pages, 3 figures. This paper (without Appendix) appears in the proceedings of AAAI'19

英文摘要：

Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group's accuracy on variously structured social networks.

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