在流动民主中通过加权代理来跟踪真相
Tracking Truth by Weighting Proxies in Liquid Democracy
摘要：
我们研究了流动民主中的群体智慧效应，允许代理人通过混合他们的代表团来分配权重给代理人。我们表明，在这种设置-不像在标准的投票总是完全委托给一个代理-它成为可能，以确定授权结构，优化真相跟踪的准确性组。我们对比这种集中式的解决方案与组的准确性时，代理人互动的greenhouse试图通过混合代表团，以最大限度地提高自己的个人准确性的平衡，并研究这些游戏的无政府状态的无政府代价。虽然混合代表团的均衡可能与标准代表团设置一样糟糕，但它们永远不会更糟，有时可能更好。
英文摘要：
We study wisdom of the crowd effects in liquid democracy when agents are allowed to apportion weights to proxies by mixing their delegations. We show that in this setting -- unlike in the standard one where votes are always delegated in full to one proxy -- it becomes possible to identify delegation structures that optimize the truth-tracking accuracy of the group. We contrast this centralized solution with the group accuracy obtained in equilibrium when agents interact by greedily trying to maximize their own individual accuracy through mixed delegations, and study the price of anarchy of these games. While equilibria with mixed delegations may be as bad as in the standard delegations setting, they are never worse and may sometimes be better.
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