标准化范围投票广泛抵制控制
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
摘要：
我们研究了范围投票和归一化范围投票在选举控制方面的行为。选举控制包括选举主席试图改变选举结构以改变结果。我们表明，一个投票系统抵制控制的情况下，证明执行控制的情况下，计算是不可行的。范围投票是赞成投票的自然延伸，而标准化范围投票是一个简单的变体，它改变了每一张选票，以最大限度地提高每个选民的潜在影响。我们表明，归一化范围投票的控制电阻之间的自然投票系统的数量最多。
英文摘要：
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control resistances among natural voting systems.
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