孔多塞准则的半随机不可能性
Semi-Random Impossibilities of Condorcet Criterion
摘要:
孔多塞准则(Condorcet criterion,CC)是一个经典的、被广泛接受的投票准则。不幸的是,它与许多其他必要条件不相容,包括参与性(Par),中途单调性(HM),Maskin单调性(MM)和防策略性(SP)。这种不相容性通常被称为不可能性定理,并通过最坏情况分析来证明。以前的工作已经调查了在某些模型下发生这些不可能性的可能性,这些模型经常被批评为不切实际。我们通过证明第一组半随机不可能性来加强以前的工作,以满足CC和更一般的四个必要条件的组版本:对于任何足够大数目的投票者$n$、任何大小的组$1\le B\le \sqrt n$、任何投票规则$r$,并且在包括公平文化的{ \em半随机}模型的大类下,$r$满足CC和Par、CC和HM、CC和MM或CC和SP的可能性是$1-Ω(\frac{B}{\sqrt n})$。这与CC和Par($B=1$)以及CC和SP($B\le \sqrt n$)的现有下限相匹配,表明许多常用的投票规则在这种情况下已经是渐近最优的。
英文摘要:
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and strategy-proofness (SP). Such incompatibilities are often known as impossibility theorems, and are proved by worst-case analysis. Previous work has investigated the likelihood for these impossibilities to occur under certain models, which are often criticized of being unrealistic. We strengthen previous work by proving the first set of semi-random impossibilities for voting rules to satisfy CC and the more general, group versions of the four desiderata: for any sufficiently large number of voters $n$, any size of the group $1\le B\le \sqrt n$, any voting rule $r$, and under a large class of {\em semi-random} models that include Impartial Culture, the likelihood for $r$ to satisfy CC and Par, CC and HM, CC and MM, or CC and SP is $1-Ω(\frac{B}{\sqrt n})$. This matches existing lower bounds for CC and Par ($B=1$) and CC and SP ($B\le \sqrt n$), showing that many commonly-studied voting rules are already asymptotically optimal in such cases.
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