政党选举中的搅局者易感性
Spoiler Susceptibility in Party Elections
AI总结：
该研究针对政党选举中无明确胜负分界的问题，提出更通用的搅局者定义，证明席位-得票函数中仅恒等函数抗搅局，还提出搅局程度度量并扩展COMSOC概率模型以比较多获胜者规则的搅局者易感性。
摘要：
选举搅局者通常被定义为落选候选人，若将其移除，会改变获胜者从而影响选举结果。截至目前，搅局效应主要在单获胜者选举制度中得到分析。我们在政党选举背景下研究这一主题，该场景下获胜者与落选者之间不再有明确界限。因此，我们提出一个更具普适性的定义：若某一政党的出局会导致其他任一政党的选举结果得票占比下降，则该政党为搅局者。我们刻画了零和投票方法下具备抗搅局性的选举分配规则。具体而言，我们证明对于席位-得票函数而言，仅有恒等函数具备抗搅局性。然而，即便常见选举规则下搅局者不可避免，其预期影响也会因规则不同而存在差异。因此，我们提出一种搅局程度度量指标，使我们能够通过实验比较多种多获胜者社会选择规则的搅局者易感性。由于计算社会选择（COMSOC）领域所用的概率模型是针对非政党选举开发的，我们对其进行扩展以生成多选区政党选举场景。
英文摘要：
An electoral spoiler is usually defined as a losing candidate whose removal would affect the outcome by changing the winner. So far, spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily for single-winner electoral systems. We consider this subject in the context of party elections, where there is no longer a sharp distinction between winners and losers. Hence, we propose a more general definition, under which a party is a spoiler if their elimination causes any other party's share in the outcome to decrease. We characterize spoiler-proof electoral allocation rules for zero-sum voting methods. In particular, we prove that for seats-votes functions only identity is spoiler-proof. However, even if spoilers are unavoidable under common electoral rules, their expected impact can vary depending on the rule. Hence, we introduce a measure of spoilership, which allows us to experimentally compare a number of multiwinner social choice rules according to their spoiler susceptibility. Since the probabilistic models used in COMSOC have been developed for nonparty elections, we extend them to generate multidistrict party elections.
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