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arXiv 2012.02856cs.GTecon.THmath.OCmath.PR
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论政治运动的资源分配

On the Resource Allocation for Political Campaigns

Sebastián Morales, Charles Thraves

摘要:

在竞选活动中,候选人必须决定如何在一个国家的各地区之间最佳地分配他们的努力/资源。因此,选举的结果将取决于玩家的策略和选民的偏好。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个零和游戏,其中两个候选人决定如何在一组区域中投资固定资源,同时考虑他们的大小和偏见。我们探讨了多数票制(MS)以及选举团(EC)投票制度。在确定性模型中,证明了MS下均衡解的存在唯一性,并在固定区域子集和放松非负投资约束条件下,给出了其封闭形式的表达式.对于随机情况,我们使用蒙特卡罗模拟来计算玩家的收益,以及它的梯度和海森。对于EC,由于缺乏纯策略的均衡,我们提出了一个迭代算法,以寻找在单纯形格的一个子集的混合策略的均衡。我们举例说明了两种选举制度下的数值例子,并对比了参与者的均衡策略。最后,我们表明,极化诱导候选人专注于更大的区域下MS的负偏差,而候选人集中在摇摆状态下EC。

英文摘要:

In an election campaign, candidates must decide how to optimally allocate their efforts/resources optimally among the regions of a country. As a result, the outcome of the election will depend on the players' strategies and the voters' preferences. In this work, we present a zero-sum game where two candidates decide how to invest a fixed resource in a set of regions, while considering their sizes and biases. We explore the Majority System (MS) as well as the Electoral College (EC) voting systems. We prove equilibrium existence and uniqueness under MS in a deterministic model; in addition, their closed form expressions are provided when fixing the subset of regions and relaxing the non-negative investing constraint. For the stochastic case, we use Monte Carlo simulations to compute the players' payoffs, together with its gradient and hessian. For the EC, given the lack of Equilibrium in pure strategies, we propose an iterative algorithm to find Equilibrium in mixed strategies in a subset of the simplex lattice. We illustrate numerical instances under both election systems, and contrast players' equilibrium strategies. Finally, we show that polarization induces candidates to focus on larger regions with negative biases under MS, whereas candidates concentrate on swing states under EC.

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