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arXiv 2402.08144cs.GTcs.AI
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迭代投票的平均情形分析

Average-Case Analysis of Iterative Voting

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute(罗格斯理工学院);Rutgers University(罗格斯大学)

Joshua Kavner, Lirong Xia

AI总结:

针对迭代相对多数投票的福利效应,本文将平均情形分析扩展到三个备选方案,刻画不同偏好分布下其改善或降低渐近福利的条件。

摘要:

迭代投票是社会选择理论中一种自然的重复策略决策模型:在群体决策最终确定之前,智能体有机会更新其投票。先前工作通过改造“无政府状态价格”,分析了在均衡状态下,相对于真实投票偏好组合,迭代相对多数投票对所选结果福利的效能。然而,先前分析仅研究了智能体偏好按公正文化分布时的最坏情形和平均情形表现。本工作将平均情形分析全面扩展至三个备选方案,并区分在哪些智能体偏好分布下,迭代相对多数投票会改善或降低渐近福利。

英文摘要:

Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice theory when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of iterative plurality on the welfare of the chosen outcome at equilibrium, relative to the truthful vote profile, via an adaptation of the price of anarchy. However, prior analyses have only studied the worst- and average-case performances when agents' preferences are distributed by the impartial culture. This work extends average-case analysis comprehensively across three alternatives and distinguishes under which of agents' preference distributions iterative plurality improves or degrades asymptotic welfare.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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