arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1402.3643cs.GTcs.DS
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动态匹配市场设计

Dynamic Matching Market Design

Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li, Shayan Oveis Gharan

摘要:

我们介绍了一个简单的基准模型的动态匹配网络市场,代理商到达和离开随机和网络之间的代理商可接受的交易形成一个随机图。我们从三个角度分析我们的模型:等待,优化和信息。我们分析的主要观点是,等待市场重新启动可能比提高交易速度更重要,这对等待成本的存在非常重要。从优化的角度来看,选择正确的时间来匹配代理但不利用全局网络结构的朴素局部算法可以执行非常接近最优算法的操作。从信息的角度来看,即使是采用代理人的出发时间的部分信息的算法也比那些缺乏此类信息的算法表现得更好。为了得到代理的离开时间,我们设计了一个激励相容的连续时间动态机制,没有转移。

英文摘要:

We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three perspectives: waiting, optimization, and information. The main insight of our analysis is that waiting to thicken the market can be substantially more important than increasing the speed of transactions, and this is quite robust to the presence of waiting costs. From an optimization perspective, naive local algorithms, that choose the right time to match agents but do not exploit global network structure, can perform very close to optimal algorithms. From an information perspective, algorithms that employ even partial information on agents' departure times perform substantially better than those that lack such information. To elicit agents' departure times, we design an incentive-compatible continuous-time dynamic mechanism without transfers.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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