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arXiv 2501.12503cs.DScs.GT
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带面试环节的稳定匹配

Stable Matching with Interviews

Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani, Amin Saberi

AI总结:

针对双边市场中偏好发现不足导致的匹配摩擦,本文扩展Gale-Shapley延迟接受机制,提出两种算法(自适应与非自适应)在面试环节下寻找临时稳定匹配,并限制面试次数为对数级别。

摘要:

在包括劳动市场和婚恋市场在内的多个双边市场中,参与者在相互互动之前通常对其偏好仅有有限的信息。这一问题可能导致匹配摩擦,例如在医学住院医师劳动市场中,高申请率之后伴随着大量的面试。然而,关于双边匹配的大量文献主要关注参与者已知晓其偏好的模型,而忽略了为发现偏好所必需的互动环节。本文采用算法方法研究该问题,将Gale-Shapley的延迟接受机制扩展到此情境中。\n 本文提出了两种算法。第一种是自适应算法,它在Gale-Shapley的延迟接受机制基础上,通过纳入申请者与职位之间的面试来扩展。与延迟接受机制类似,一方依次向另一方提出申请。然而,提议的顺序经过精心选择,以确保找到一个临时稳定匹配。此外,以高概率,每位申请者或职位进行的面试次数限制在O(log^2 n)以内。\n 在许多季节性市场中,互动更为同步,包括一个初始面试阶段,随后是一个清算阶段。我们提出了一种非自适应算法,用于在分层随机市场中生成单阶段集合。该算法在此类市场中找到一个临时稳定匹配,同时为每位申请者或职位分配不超过O(log^3 n)次面试。

英文摘要:

In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for medical residencies, where high application rates are followed by a large number of interviews. Yet, the extensive literature on two-sided matching primarily focuses on models where agents know their preferences, leaving the interactions necessary for preference discovery largely overlooked. This paper studies this problem using an algorithmic approach, extending Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance to this context. Two algorithms are proposed. The first is an adaptive algorithm that expands upon Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance by incorporating interviews between applicants and positions. Similar to deferred acceptance, one side sequentially proposes to the other. However, the order of proposals is carefully chosen to ensure an interim stable matching is found. Furthermore, with high probability, the number of interviews conducted by each applicant or position is limited to $O(\log^2 n)$. In many seasonal markets, interactions occur more simultaneously, consisting of an initial interview phase followed by a clearing stage. We present a non-adaptive algorithm for generating a single stage set of in tiered random markets. The algorithm finds an interim stable matching in such markets while assigning no more than $O(\log^3 n)$ interviews to each applicant or position.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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