We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). For an instance $I$ of SMI there may be many stable matchings, providing significantly different outcomes for the sets of men and women. We introduce two new notions of fairness in SMI. Firstly, a regret-equal stable matching minimises the difference in ranks of a worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among all stable matchings. Secondly, a min-regret sum stable matching minimises the sum of ranks of a worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among all stable matchings. We present two new efficient algorithms to find stable matchings of these types. Firstly, the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm finds a regret-equal stable matching in $O(d_0 nm)$ time, where $d_0$ is the absolute difference in ranks between a worst-off man and a worst-off woman in the man-optimal stable matching, $n$ is the number of men or women, and $m$ is the total length of all preference lists. Secondly, the Min-Regret Sum Algorithm finds a min-regret sum stable matching in $O(d_s m)$ time, where $d_s$ is the difference in the ranks between a worst-off man in each of the woman-optimal and man-optimal stable matchings. Experiments to compare several types of fair optimal stable matchings were conducted and show that the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm produces matchings that are competitive with respect to other fairness objectives. On the other hand, existing types of "fair" stable matchings did not provide as close an approximation to regret-equal stable matchings.
The study of fair algorithms has become mainstream in machine learning and artificial intelligence due to its increasing demand in dealing with biases and discrimination. Along this line, researchers have considered fair versions of traditional optimization problems including clustering, regression, ranking and voting. However, most of the efforts have been channeled into designing heuristic algorithms, which often do not provide any guarantees on the quality of the solution. In this work, we study matching problems with the notion of proportional fairness. Proportional fairness is one of the …
Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching, online advertising, and image recognition, among others. Although many optimal solutions may exist to a given matching problem, when the elements that shall or not be included in a solution correspond to individuals, it becomes of paramount importance that the solution be selected fairly. In this paper we study individual fairness in matching problems. Given that …
Automatically matching reviewers to papers is a crucial step of the peer review process for venues receiving thousands of submissions. Unfortunately, common paper matching algorithms often construct matchings suffering from two critical problems: (1) the group of reviewers assigned to a paper do not collectively possess sufficient expertise, and (2) reviewer workloads are highly skewed. In this paper, we propose a novel local fairness formulation of paper matching that directly addresses both of these issues. Since optimizing our formulation is not always tractable, we introduce two new algori…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the context of a two-sided market, where there are two sets of agents, and each agent has preferences over the other set. The goal is producing a matching between the sets. This setting has been the focus of a rich body of work. The seminal work of Gale and Shapley formulated a stability desideratum, and showed that a stable matching always exists and can be found eff…
We consider the allocation of limited resources to heterogeneous customers who arrive in an online fashion. We would like to allocate the resources "fairly", so that no group of customers is marginalized in terms of their overall service rate. We study whether this is possible to do so in an online fashion, and if so, what a good online allocation policy is. We model this problem using online bipartite matching under stationary arrivals, a fundamental model in the literature typically studied under the objective of maximizing the total number of customers served. We instead study the objective…
We consider the problem of assigning items to platforms in the presence of group fairness constraints. In the input, each item belongs to certain categories, called classes in this paper. Each platform specifies the group fairness constraints through an upper bound on the number of items it can serve from each class. Additionally, each platform also has an upper bound on the total number of items it can serve. The goal is to assign items to platforms so as to maximize the number of items assigned while satisfying the upper bounds of each class. In some cases, there is a revenue associated with…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is, where agents have to be matched to other agents, has received much less attention. Moreover, two-sided matching literature has largely focused on ordinal preferences. This paper initiates the study of fairness in stable many-to-one matchings under cardinal valuations. Motivated by real-world settings, we study leximin optimality over stable many-to-one matchings…
We analyze the (parameterized) computational complexity of "fair" variants of bipartite many-to-one matching, where each vertex from the "left" side is matched to exactly one vertex and each vertex from the "right" side may be matched to multiple vertices. We want to find a "fair" matching, in which each vertex from the right side is matched to a "fair" set of vertices. Assuming that each vertex from the left side has one color modeling its attribute, we study two fairness criteria. In one of them, we deem a vertex set fair if for any two colors, the difference between the numbers of their occ…
We study a natural generalization of stable matching to the maximum weight stable matching problem and we obtain a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for it by reducing it to the problem of finding a maximum weight ideal cut in a DAG. We give the first polynomial time algorithm for the latter problem; this algorithm is also combinatorial. The combinatorial nature of our algorithms not only means that they are efficient but also that they enable us to obtain additional structural and algorithmic results: - We show that the set, $\cal M'$, of maximum weight stable matchings forms a sublatti…
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new structural question concerning the stable matching problem, namely finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances. Our main algorithmic result is the following: We identify a polynomially large class of errors, $D$, that can be introduced in a stable matching instance. Given an instance $A$ of stable matching, let $B$ be the random…
A matching in a bipartite graph with parts X and Y is called envy-free if no unmatched vertex in X is a adjacent to a matched vertex in Y. Every perfect matching is envy-free, but envy-free matchings exist even when perfect matchings do not. We prove that every bipartite graph has a unique partition such that all envy-free matchings are contained in one of the partition sets. Using this structural theorem, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an envy-free matching of maximum cardinality. For edge-weighted bipartite graphs, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maxi…
Columbia University（哥伦比亚大学）；New Jersey Institute of Technology（新泽西理工学院）；Southeast University（东南大学）
Matching markets involve heterogeneous agents (typically from two parties) who are paired for mutual benefit. During the last decade, matching markets have emerged and grown rapidly through the medium of the Internet. They have evolved into a new format, called Online Matching Markets (OMMs), with examples ranging from crowdsourcing to online recommendations to ridesharing. There are two features distinguishing OMMs from traditional matching markets. One is the dynamic arrival of one side of the market: we refer to these as online agents while the rest are offline agents. Examples of online an…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a super-stable matching if a super-stable matching exists. In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of a super-stable matching. We call our generalization of a super-stable matching a super-stable common independent set. This can be considered as a generalization of the matroid generalization of a stable matching for strict preferences proposed by Fl…
Fair classification has been a topic of intense study in machine learning, and several algorithms have been proposed towards this important task. However, in a recent study, Friedler et al. observed that fair classification algorithms may not be stable with respect to variations in the training dataset -- a crucial consideration in several real-world applications. Motivated by their work, we study the problem of designing classification algorithms that are both fair and stable. We propose an extended framework based on fair classification algorithms that are formulated as optimization problems…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be NP-hard in general. Our contribution is two fold: a polyhedral characterization and an approximation algorithm. Previously Chen et al. have shown that the stable matching polytope is integral if and only if the subgraph obtained after running phase one of Irving's algorithm is bipartite. We improve upon this result by showing that there are instances where thi…
An instance of the super-stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list of ties. Ties are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex. An edge $(x,y) \in E \backslash M$ is a blocking edge for a matching $M$ if by getting matched to each other neither of the vertices $x$ and $y$ would become worse off. Thus, there is no disadvantage if the two vertices would like to match up. A matching $M$ is super-stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to $M$. It has previously…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an approximately stable matching (in terms of number of blocking pairs) at all times. The changes in the preference lists are not reported to the algorithm, but must instead be probed explicitly by the algorithm. We design an algorithm that in expectation and with high probability maintains a matching that has at most $O((log (n))^2)$ blocking pairs.
We consider a general class of combinatorial optimization problems including among others allocation, multiple knapsack, matching or travelling salesman problems. The standard version of those problems is the maximum weight optimization problem where a sum of values is optimized. However, the sum is not a good aggregation function when the fairness of the distribution of those values (corresponding for example to different agents' utilities or criteria) is important. In this paper, using the generalized Gini index (GGI), a well-known inequality measure, instead of the sum to model fairness, we…
An instance of a strongly stable matching problem (SSMP) is an undirected bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list of each vertex being a linearly ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex. Ties are disjoint and may contain one vertex. A matching $M$ is a set of vertex-disjoint edges. An edge $(x,y) \in E \setminus M$ is a {\em blocking edge} for $M$ if $x$ is either unmatched or strictly prefers $y$ to its current partner in $M$, and $y$ is either unmatched or strictly prefers $x$ to its current partner in $M$ or is indifferent betwee…
In this article we study the stable marriage game induced by the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. Our setting is standard: all the lists are complete and the matching mechanism is the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. It is well known that in this setting, men cannot cheat, but women can. In fact, Teo, Sethuraman and Tan \cite{TST01}, show that there is a polynomial time algorithm to obtain, for a given strategy (the set of all lists) $Q$ and a woman $w$, the best partner attainable by changing her list. However, what if the resulting matching is not stable with respect to $Q$? Obviou…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give subquadratic algorithms for finding a stable matching in special cases of natural succinct representations of the problem, the $d$-attribute, $d$-list, geometric, and single-peaked models. We also present algorithms for verifying a stable matching in the same models. We further show that for $d = ω(\log n)$ both finding and verifying a stable matching in the $d$-att…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes all pairs from $Q$, no pair from $P$, and that is as close as possible to $M_1$. We study this problem in four classical stable matching settings: Stable Roommates (with Ties) and Stable Marriage (with Ties). As our main contribution, we employ the theory of rotations for Stable Roommates to develop a polynomial-time algorithm for adapting Stable Roommates m…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a given Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates instance is called coalitional exchange-stable if it does not admit any exchange-blocking coalition, that is, a subset S of agents in which everyone prefers the partner of some other agent in S. The matching is exchange-stable if it does not admit any exchange-blocking pair, that is, an exchange-blocking coalition o…
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this problem, the existing literature on matching with externalities permits agents to provide complete and total rankings over matchings based off of both their own and their affiliates' matches. This complete ordering restriction is unrealistic, and further the model may have an empty core. To address this, we introduce the Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching (DA…
Let $G$ be a graph and suppose we are given, for each $v \in V(G)$, a strict ordering of the neighbors of $v$. A set of matchings ${\cal M}$ of $G$ is called internally stable if there are no matchings $M,M' \in {\cal M}$ such that an edge of $M$ blocks $M'$. The sets of stable (à la Gale and Shapley) matchings and of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings are examples of internally stable sets of matching. In this paper, we study, in both the marriage and the roommate case, inclusionwise maximal internally stable sets of matchings. We call those sets internally closed. By building on known …
