匹配市场中的混沌与解列
Chaos and Unraveling in Matching Markets
摘要：
我们研究了信息扰动如何破坏双边匹配市场的稳定。在我们的模型中，代理商在两个时期内到达市场，而第一时期的代理商不知道后来到达的代理商的类型。已经在市场上的代理商可能会提前匹配或等待一小群新进入者。尽管缺乏折扣或风险规避，这种扰动创造了激励，以尽早匹配，并在新的代理人到达之前离开市场。这些激励措施不会随着市场的扩大而消失。此外，我们确定了一个新的不利现象，在这种情况下：随着市场得到大的概率\emph{chaos} -其中没有早期匹配计划现有代理是强大的成对偏差-方法1。这些结果与代理人类型的分布无关，并且对市场双方之间的不对称性具有鲁棒性。因此，我们的研究结果表明，匹配市场是非常敏感的制度细节和不确定性。
英文摘要：
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already present in the market may match early or wait for the small group of new entrants. Despite the lack of discounting or risk aversion, this perturbation creates incentives to match early and leave the market before the new agents arrive. These incentives do not disappear as the market gets large. Moreover, we identify a new adverse phenomenon in this setting: as markets get large the probability of \emph{chaos} -- where no early matching scheme for existing agents is robust to pairwise deviations -- approaches 1. These results are independent of the distribution of agents' types and robust to asymmetries between the two sides of the market. Our findings thus suggest that matching markets are extremely sensitive to institutional details and uncertainty.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
