匹配市场中的收入非单调性
Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
AI总结：
本文研究了VCG机制在匹配市场中的收入非单调性，指出其非单调性并非由互补性导致，而是普遍存在的现象。
摘要：
维克雷-克拉克-格罗夫斯（VCG）机制在组合拍卖中以收入非单调性著称。即，当买家对一组物品的价值增加时，拍卖总收入可能减少。组合拍卖表现出互补性，这在拍卖理论中导致了复杂性。本文简要说明，多物品拍卖中的非单调性并非源于互补性，事实上，VCG在匹配市场中也是收入非单调的。
英文摘要：
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit complementarities which broadly result in complexities in auction theory. This brief note shows that non-monotonicity in multi-item auctions is not a result of complementarities, and in fact, VCG is revenue non-monotone even in matching markets.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
