发表机构
Beijing Institute of Technology; Renmin University of China（北京理工大学; 中国人民大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究匹配市场中的贸易收益，将双边贸易的次优保证推广至一般匹配市场，并给出两类情形下精确的最坏情况比率，证明界限紧性。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究了在具有独立私有价值和成本、贝叶斯激励相容性、临时个体理性以及无预期预算赤字的匹配市场中的贸易收益。一个针对有限双边贸易的次优保证可以无损地扩展到具有独立博雷尔先验、任意向下封闭可行性以及有限期望一阶最优收益的匹配市场。对于具有单调风险率的有限买方和任意有限卖方，我们确定了次优收益与一阶最优收益的精确最坏情况比率，约为0.72490721。对于具有至多m种类型的二元买方和卖方，我们确定了每个m的精确比率，包括当m=2时的8/9以及当m增长时的极限4/5。这两个界限族在双边贸易中已经是紧的。
英文摘要
We study gains from trade in matching markets with independent private values and costs, Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and no expected budget deficit. A second-best guarantee for finite bilateral trade extends without loss to matching markets with independent Borel priors, arbitrary downward-closed feasibility, and finite expected first-best gains. For bounded buyers with monotone hazard rates and arbitrary bounded sellers, we determine the exact worst-case ratio of second-best to first-best gains, approximately $0.72490721$. For binary buyers and sellers with at most $m$ types, we determine the exact ratio for every $m$, including $8/9$ when $m=2$ and a limit of $4/5$ as $m$ grows. Both families of bounds are tight already in bilateral trade.
