arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv cs/0205075cs.GTcs.CCcs.MA
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机制设计的复杂性

Complexity of Mechanism Design

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

摘要:

冲突偏好的聚集是多智能体系统的核心问题。关键的困难在于代理人可能会不真诚地报告他们的偏好。机制设计是一门设计游戏规则的艺术,这样代理人就有动力如实地报告他们的偏好,并选择一个(社会)理想的结果。我们提出了一种方法,其中的机制是自动创建的偏好聚合设置在手。这有几个优点,但缺点是每次都需要重新解决机制设计优化问题。侧重于设置侧付款是不可能的,我们表明,机制设计问题是NP完全的确定性机制。这既适用于优势策略实现,也适用于贝叶斯-纳什实现。然后,我们表明,如果我们允许随机机制,机制设计问题变得易于处理。换句话说,协调器可以通过使代理面临额外的不确定性来解决由其关于代理的偏好的不确定性所引入的计算复杂性。这在(社会)目标上没有损失,在某些情况下是有收获的。

英文摘要:

The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is automatically created for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time. Focusing on settings where side payments are not possible, we show that the mechanism design problem is NP-complete for deterministic mechanisms. This holds both for dominant-strategy implementation and for Bayes-Nash implementation. We then show that if we allow randomized mechanisms, the mechanism design problem becomes tractable. In other words, the coordinator can tackle the computational complexity introduced by its uncertainty about the agents' preferences by making the agents face additional uncertainty. This comes at no loss, and in some cases at a gain, in the (social) objective.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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