arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2002.06329cs.GT
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单心智智能体的最优机制设计

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents

Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg

摘要:

我们考虑收入最优的机制设计的interdimensional设置,其中一个维度是“价值”的买家,一个是“类型”,捕捉一些辅助信息。一个设置是联邦快递问题,FGKK [2016]描述了单个代理的最佳机制。我们要问:这种定性能走多远?特别是,我们考虑单一的代理人。卖家有不同的商品。一个购买者对于特定的物品子集S有一个价值v,当他(至少)得到S中的所有物品时,他就得到价值v。我们显示:1.确定性机制是最佳的分配,满足“边际收益递减”(DMR)的属性,我们给出了一个明确的建设的最佳机制。2.在没有DMR的情况下,结果取决于表示类型之间的偏序的有向无环图(DAG)的结构。当DAG的出度不超过1时,我们刻画了一个联邦快递的最优机制。3.在没有DMR的情况下,当DAG有一些节点的出度至少为2时,我们证明了在这种情况下菜单复杂度是无界的:对于任何M,存在分布在(v,S)对上,使得最优机制的菜单复杂度至少为M。4.对于3种类型的情况下,我们表明,所有的分布存在一个有限的菜单复杂性的最佳机制。这与2个添加剂异质项目或菜单复杂性可能无法计数的项目形成对比[MV 07; DDT 15]。此外,我们证明了多单位定价(无DMR)的最优机制可以有无限的菜单复杂性。我们还提出了一个扩展的菜单复杂性的最佳机制可以可数,但不是不可数的。总之,这些结果表明,在跨维度设置的最佳机制都比单维设置更丰富,但也大大超过多维设置的结构。

英文摘要:

We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK [2016] characterize the optimal mechanism for a single agent. We ask: how far can such characterizations go? In particular, we consider single-minded agents. A seller has heterogenous items. A buyer has a value v for a specific subset of items S, and obtains value v iff he gets (at least) all the items in S. We show: 1. Deterministic mechanisms are optimal for distributions that satisfy the "declining marginal revenue" (DMR) property; we give an explicit construction of the optimal mechanism. 2. Without DMR, the result depends on the structure of the directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing the partial order among types. When the DAG has out-degree at most 1, we characterize the optimal mechanism a la FedEx. 3. Without DMR, when the DAG has some node with out-degree at least 2, we show that in this case the menu complexity is unbounded: for any M, there exist distributions over (v,S) pairs such that the menu complexity of the optimal mechanism is at least M. 4. For the case of 3 types, we show that for all distributions there exists an optimal mechanism of finite menu complexity. This is in contrast to 2 additive heterogenous items or which the menu complexity could be uncountable [MV07; DDT15]. In addition, we prove that optimal mechanisms for Multi-Unit Pricing (without DMR) can have unbounded menu complexity. We also propose an extension where the menu complexity of optimal mechanisms can be countable but not uncountable. Together these results establish that optimal mechanisms in interdimensional settings are both much richer than single-dimensional settings, yet also vastly more structured than multi-dimensional settings.

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