We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK [2016] characterize the optimal mechanism for a single agent. We ask: how far can such characterizations go? In particular, we consider single-minded agents. A seller has heterogenous items. A buyer has a value v for a specific subset of items S, and obtains value v iff he gets (at least) all the items in S. We show:
1. Deterministic mechanisms are optimal for distributions that satisfy the "declining marginal revenue" (DMR) property; we give an explicit construction of the optimal mechanism.
2. Without DMR, the result depends on the structure of the directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing the partial order among types. When the DAG has out-degree at most 1, we characterize the optimal mechanism a la FedEx.
3. Without DMR, when the DAG has some node with out-degree at least 2, we show that in this case the menu complexity is unbounded: for any M, there exist distributions over (v,S) pairs such that the menu complexity of the optimal mechanism is at least M.
4. For the case of 3 types, we show that for all distributions there exists an optimal mechanism of finite menu complexity. This is in contrast to 2 additive heterogenous items or which the menu complexity could be uncountable [MV07; DDT15].
In addition, we prove that optimal mechanisms for Multi-Unit Pricing (without DMR) can have unbounded menu complexity. We also propose an extension where the menu complexity of optimal mechanisms can be countable but not uncountable.
Together these results establish that optimal mechanisms in interdimensional settings are both much richer than single-dimensional settings, yet also vastly more structured than multi-dimensional settings.
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility
对于具有线性效用的代理人来说,向具有独立但不相同分布的价值的代理人出售单一物品的收入最优机制是复杂的(Myerson,1981),并且对于具有非线性效用的代理人来说没有封闭形式的表征(参见1981)。Alaei等人,2012年)。尽管如此,对于满足自然规律性的线性效用代理,Alaei et al.(2018)表明,简单地发布匿名价格是一种e近似。我们给出了一个参数化的正则性属性,扩展到代理商的非线性效用,并表明,近似界的匿名定价定期代理商近似扩展到代理商,满足这个近似的正则性属性。我们应用这个近似框架来证明匿名定价是一个常数近似的收入最优的单项目拍卖代理公共预算的效用,私人预算的效用,和(一个特殊情况下)风险厌恶的效用。
Agent-Temporal Credit Assignment for Optimal Policy Preservation in Sparse Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Tata Consultancy Services(塔塔咨询服务公司);Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Goa(果阿贝拉理工学院);University of Edinburgh(爱丁堡大学);University of Manchester(曼彻斯特大学);Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay(印度理工学院孟买分校)