具有单一投标人的最优多部件组合采购拍卖
An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders
摘要：
最优组合拍卖中的现有技术限于处理多个物品的单个单元的情况，其中每个投标人对恰好一个捆绑出价（单一的投标人）。本文扩展了现有的技术，提出了一个最优拍卖采购多个单位的多个项目时，投标人是一心一意的。该拍卖在满足贝叶斯激励相容性和个体过渡理性的前提下，最小化了采购成本。在适当的正则性条件下，这种最优拍卖也满足优势策略激励相容性。
英文摘要：
The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded. The auction minimizes the cost of procurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction also satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
