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arXiv 1310.0177cs.GT
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无货币的组合拍卖

Combinatorial Auctions without Money

Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre

摘要:

计算机机制设计试图将计算和激励结合起来,主要是通过利用设计者和自私代理之间的货币转移。这主要是因为在没有钱的情况下,很少能做到强制真实。然而,在某些情况下,金钱是无法获得的,在道德上是不可接受的,或者可能只是与机制的目标不一致。例如,在组合拍卖(CA)中,该领域的典型问题,我们的目标是最大化社会福利的解决方案,但仍然要求社会确保真实性。此外,CA的真实性已经很难理解的情况下,投标人碰巧只对两套不同的货物感兴趣。我们专注于设计激励兼容CA没有钱在一般设置的$k$ -头脑投标人。我们交易货币转移,观察到该机制可以检测投标人的某些谎言:即,我们学习真实的CA,有验证,没有钱。我们证明了一个真实的机制,这使得一个有趣的平行与CA的钱为一心一意的投标人的情况下理解。然后,当集合和估值是竞标者的私人知识时,我们给出了通过确定性或随机真实机制获得的逼近比的许多上界。(Most在多项式时间中运行,并返回具有(几乎)最佳可能近似保证的解决方案。我们补充这些积极的结果与一些下界(其中一些基本上是紧的),在更容易的情况下举行的公共集。因此,我们提供了一个几乎完整的图片真实近似CA在这个一般设置与多维投标人。

英文摘要:

Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to enforce truthfulness. However, in certain applications, money is unavailable, morally unacceptable or might simply be at odds with the objective of the mechanism. For example, in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs), the paradigmatic problem of the area, we aim at solutions of maximum social welfare but still charge the society to ensure truthfulness. Additionally, truthfulness of CAs is poorly understood already in the case in which bidders happen to be interested in only two different sets of goods. We focus on the design of incentive-compatible CAs without money in the general setting of $k$-minded bidders. We trade monetary transfers with the observation that the mechanism can detect certain lies of the bidders: i.e., we study truthful CAs with verification and without money. We prove a characterization of truthful mechanisms, which makes an interesting parallel with the well-understood case of CAs with money for single-minded bidders. We then give a host of upper bounds on the approximation ratio obtained by either deterministic or randomized truthful mechanisms when the sets and valuations are private knowledge of the bidders. (Most of these mechanisms run in polynomial time and return solutions with (nearly) best possible approximation guarantees.) We complement these positive results with a number of lower bounds (some of which are essentially tight) that hold in the easier case of public sets. We thus provide an almost complete picture of truthfully approximating CAs in this general setting with multi-dimensional bidders.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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