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arXiv 2412.00563cs.GT
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为贝叶斯智能体设计容量不足设施的最优定位机制

Designing Optimal Mechanisms to Locate Facilities with Insufficient Capacity for Bayesian Agents

Gennaro Auricchio, Jie Zhang

AI总结:

本文针对资源稀缺的贝叶斯智能体设施定位问题,结合最优传输理论设计最优真实机制,证明单设施最优机制存在并扩展到双设施场景,通过数值实验验证了机制性能及收敛性。

摘要:

本文研究了资源稀缺的设施定位问题(FLPSR),假设智能体的类型服从概率分布。在FLPSR中,目标是确定一个或多个有容量限制的设施的最优位置,以最大化社会福利(SW),社会福利定义为所有智能体效用的总和。然而,设施的总容量不足以容纳所有智能体,因此智能体通过先来先服务(First-Come-First-Served)博弈来决定是否被容纳以及其效用。本文的主要贡献是将最优传输理论与为FLPSR设计适合智能体类型分布的最佳真实机制问题联系起来。由于这种联系,我们确定了当智能体数量趋于无穷大时最大化期望SW的机制。对于单个设施的情况,我们证明最优机制始终存在。我们研究了三类概率分布,要么通过解析形式表示最优机制,要么提供数值计算最优机制的程序。然后,我们将结果扩展到需要放置两个有容量限制的设施的情况。虽然我们最初假设智能体是独立同分布的,但我们证明我们的技术适用于智能体非同质分布的场景。最后,我们通过几个数值实验验证了我们的发现,包括:(i)推导β分布类的最优机制;(ii)评估这些机制对少量智能体的贝叶斯近似比;(iii)评估机制获得的期望SW收敛到其极限的速度。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we study the Facility Location Problem with Scarce Resources (FLPSR) under the assumption that agents' type follow a probability distribution. In the FLPSR, the objective is to identify the optimal locations for one or more capacitated facilities to maximize Social Welfare (SW), defined as the sum of the utilities of all agents. The total capacity of the facilities, however, is not enough to accommodate all the agents, who thus compete in a First-Come-First-Served game to determine whether they get accommodated and what their utility is. The main contribution of this paper ties Optimal Transport theory to the problem of determining the best truthful mechanism for the FLPSR tailored to the agents' type distributions. Owing to this connection, we identify the mechanism that maximizes the expected SW as the number of agents goes to infinity. For the case of a single facility, we show that an optimal mechanism always exists. We examine three classes of probability distributions and characterize the optimal mechanism either analytically represent the optimal mechanism or provide a routine to numerically compute it. We then extend our results to the case in which we have two capacitated facilities to place. While we initially assume that agents are independent and identically distributed, we show that our techniques are applicable to scenarios where agents are not identically distributed. Finally, we validate our findings through several numerical experiments, including: (i) deriving optimal mechanisms for the class of beta distributions, (ii) assessing the Bayesian approximation ratio of these mechanisms for small numbers of agents, and (iii) assessing how quickly the expected SW attained by the mechanism converges to its limit.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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