arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 0906.2466cs.GTcs.DS
收藏

基于贪婪迭代包装的真实机制

Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing

Chandra Chekuri, Iftah Gamzu

摘要:

算法博弈论算法博弈论的一个重要研究方向是设计接近最优社会福利的有效诚实机制。一个基本问题是α-近似算法是否转化为α-近似真实机制。众所周知,将α-近似算法插入VCG技术中可能不会产生真实的机制。因此,研究近似算法的性质是很自然的,这些性质使它们能够在真实机制中使用。本文的主要贡献是识别近似算法的一个有用的和自然的属性,我们称之为loser独立性,这个属性适用于单一的思想和单参数设置。直觉上,当失败者的出价增加时,失败者独立算法不会改变其结果,除非该代理成为赢家。我们证明,失败者独立的算法可以采用贪婪的迭代包装方法的子程序,同时保持单调性。一个贪婪的迭代方法提供了一个很好的近似的上下文中最大化的非减子模函数的独立性约束。我们的框架产生了各种问题的真实近似机制。值得注意的是,在线机制设计中出现了一些问题。

英文摘要:

An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an α-approximation algorithm translates into an α-approximate truthful mechanism. It is well-known that plugging an α-approximation algorithm into the VCG technique may not yield a truthful mechanism. Thus, it is natural to investigate properties of approximation algorithms that enable their use in truthful mechanisms. The main contribution of this paper is to identify a useful and natural property of approximation algorithms, which we call loser-independence; this property is applicable in the single-minded and single-parameter settings. Intuitively, a loser-independent algorithm does not change its outcome when the bid of a losing agent increases, unless that agent becomes a winner. We demonstrate that loser-independent algorithms can be employed as sub-procedures in a greedy iterative packing approach while preserving monotonicity. A greedy iterative approach provides a good approximation in the context of maximizing a non-decreasing submodular function subject to independence constraints. Our framework gives rise to truthful approximation mechanisms for various problems. Notably, some problems arise in online mechanism design.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑