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arXiv 1202.2097cs.GTcs.DS
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竞争子模过程的真机制

Truthful Mechanisms for Competing Submodular Processes

Allan Borodin, Mark Braverman, Brendan Lucier, Joel Oren

摘要:

出于应用程序的口碑广告,我们考虑了一个博弈论的情况下,竞争的广告客户希望在社交网络中的目标最初采用者。每个广告客户都希望最大限度地发挥影响力,这是一个一般的网络扩散过程。然而,产品之间的竞争可能会对任何特定公司的采用率产生不利影响。由此产生的框架产生了复杂的偏好,依赖于随机扩散模型和网络拓扑结构的细节。我们从一个中心机制的角度研究这个模型,例如社交网络平台,它可以优化种子投放作为广告商的服务。我们要问:给定竞争企业报告的需求,一个机制应该如何选择种子以最大限度地提高整体效率?除了算法问题,竞争还引发了战略行为问题:理性的代理人不应该被激励少报他们的预算需求。我们表明,当有两个球员,社会福利可以$2$ -近似的多项式时间strategyproof机制。我们的机制是递归定义的,根据特定的贪婪方法随机分配种子的顺序。对于三个或三个以上的球员,我们证明,在额外的假设(满足许多现有的影响力传播模型)存在一个更简单的strategyproof $\frac{e}{e-1}$近似机制,值得注意的是,这第二种机制不一定是strategyproof时,只有两个球员。

英文摘要:

Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of influence, modeled by a general network diffusion process. However, competition between products may adversely impact the rate of adoption for any given firm. The resulting framework gives rise to complex preferences that depend on the specifics of the stochastic diffusion model and the network topology. We study this model from the perspective of a central mechanism, such as a social networking platform, that can optimize seed placement as a service for the advertisers. We ask: given the reported demands of the competing firms, how should a mechanism choose seeds to maximize overall efficiency? Beyond the algorithmic problem, competition raises issues of strategic behaviour: rational agents should not be incentivized to underreport their budget demands. We show that when there are two players, the social welfare can be $2$-approximated by a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism. Our mechanism is defined recursively, randomizing the order in which advertisers are allocated seeds according to a particular greedy method. For three or more players, we demonstrate that under additional assumptions (satisfied by many existing models of influence spread) there exists a simpler strategyproof $\frac{e}{e-1}$-approximation mechanism; notably, this second mechanism is not necessarily strategyproof when there are only two players.

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