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arXiv 1801.08808cs.GT
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利用神经网络学习最优再分配机制

Learning Optimal Redistribution Mechanisms through Neural Networks

P Manisha, C V Jawahar, Sujit Gujar

摘要:

我们考虑这样一种设置,其中$p$公共资源将在$n$竞争和战略代理之间进行分配,以最大化社会福利(对象应分配给最重视它们的人)。这就是所谓的配置效率(AE)。我们需要代理人报告他们获得这些资源的估值,如实地称为主导策略激励相容性(DSIC)。我们使用基于拍卖的机制来实现AE和DSIC,但由于Green-Laffont不可能性定理,无法确保预算平衡。也就是说,货币净转移不可能为零。这一问题已通过设计一个再分配机制来解决,以确保最低限度的资金盈余以及AE和DSIC。目标可以是最小化期望中或最坏情况下的剩余,并且这些$p$对象可以是同构的或异构的。设计重新分配机制,表现良好的预期成为异构设置的分析挑战。在本文中,我们采用了一种完全不同的数据驱动方法。我们训练一个神经网络,以确定一个最佳的再分配机制的基础上给定的设置与两个目标,最优的预期和最优的最坏的情况下。我们还提出了一个损失函数来训练一个神经网络,以优化最坏的情况。我们设计的神经网络的基本回扣功能是线性的,以及非线性的投标代理。我们的网络的性能是相同的理论保证的情况下,它已经解决了。我们观察到,一个神经网络为基础的再分配机制的同质设置,使用非线性回扣功能优于线性回扣功能时,目标是最佳的期望。我们的方法也产生了一个最佳的期望重新分配机制,异构设置。

英文摘要:

We consider a setting where $p$ public resources are to be allocated among $n$ competing and strategic agents so as to maximize social welfare (the objects should be allocated to those who value them the most). This is called allocative efficiency (AE). We need the agents to report their valuations for obtaining these resources, truthfully referred to as dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). We use auction-based mechanisms to achieve AE and DSIC yet budget balance cannot be ensured, due to Green-Laffont Impossibility Theorem. That is, the net transfer of money cannot be zero. This problem has been addressed by designing a redistribution mechanism so as to ensure a minimum surplus of money as well as AE and DSIC. The objective could be to minimize surplus in expectation or in the worst case and these $p$ objects could be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Designing redistribution mechanisms which perform well in expectation becomes analytically challenging for heterogeneous settings. In this paper, we take a completely different, data-driven approach. We train a neural network to determine an optimal redistribution mechanism based on given settings with both the objectives, optimal in expectation and optimal in the worst case. We also propose a loss function to train a neural network to optimize worst case. We design neural networks with the underlying rebate functions being linear as well as nonlinear in terms of bids of the agents. Our networks' performances are same as the theoretical guarantees for the cases where it has been solved. We observe that a neural network based redistribution mechanism for homogeneous settings which uses nonlinear rebate functions outperforms linear rebate functions when the objective is optimal in expectation. Our approach also yields an optimal in expectation redistribution mechanism for heterogeneous settings.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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