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arXiv 1401.3884cs.GT
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异构对象分配的重分布机制

Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects

Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari

摘要:

有p个异构对象被分配给n个竞争代理(n > p),每个代理都有单位需求。该分配问题需要设计一个满足弱预算平衡、个体理性和最小化预算不平衡的Groves机制。这就要求设计一个适当的折扣函数。当对象相同时,这个问题已经得到解决,我们称之为WCO机制。我们通过再分配指数来衡量这种机制的性能。我们首先证明了一个不可能定理,排除了非零重分配指标的线性折扣函数在异构对象分配。受这个定理的启发,我们探索了两种方法来解决这个不可能性。在第一种方法中,我们证明了当对象的估值具有某种类型的关系时,具有非零再分配指数的线性回扣函数是可能的,并且我们设计了一种具有最坏情况下最优的线性回扣函数的机制。在第二种方法中,我们表明,回扣功能与非零效率是可能的,如果线性放松。我们将折扣函数的WCO机制异构对象分配和猜想他们是最坏情况下的最优。

英文摘要:

There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. When the objects are identical, this problem has been solved which we refer as WCO mechanism. We measure the performance of such mechanisms by the redistribution index. We first prove an impossibility theorem which rules out linear rebate functions with non-zero redistribution index in heterogeneous object assignment. Motivated by this theorem, we explore two approaches to get around this impossibility. In the first approach, we show that linear rebate functions with non-zero redistribution index are possible when the valuations for the objects have a certain type of relationship and we design a mechanism with linear rebate function that is worst case optimal. In the second approach, we show that rebate functions with non-zero efficiency are possible if linearity is relaxed. We extend the rebate functions of the WCO mechanism to heterogeneous objects assignment and conjecture them to be worst case optimal.

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