异质对象分配中VCG支付的最优线性再分配
On Optimal Linear Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
摘要:
有p个异构对象被分配给n个竞争代理(n > p),每个代理都有单位需求。该分配问题需要设计一个满足弱预算平衡、个体理性和最小化预算不平衡的Groves机制。这就要求设计一个适当的折扣函数。我们的主要结果是一个不可能定理,排除了非零效率的线性折扣函数在异构对象分配。受这个定理的启发,我们探索了两种方法来解决这个不可能性。在第一种方法中,我们表明,非零的线性回扣函数是可能的,当对象的估值是相关的。在第二种方法中,我们表明,回扣功能与非零效率是可能的,如果线性放松。
英文摘要:
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. Our main result is an impossibility theorem which rules out linear rebate functions with non-zero efficiency in heterogeneous object assignment. Motivated by this theorem, we explore two approaches to get around this impossibility. In the first approach, we show that linear rebate functions with non-zero are possible when the valuations for the objects are correlated. In the second approach, we show that rebate functions with non-zero efficiency are possible if linearity is relaxed.
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