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arXiv 2605.00962cs.GTmath.COmath.GRmath.RT
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合作游戏中同质玩家组的诱导表示

Induced Representations in Cooperative Games with Homogeneous Groups of Players

Windsor Kiang

AI总结:

本文通过诱导表示从Young子群研究同质组游戏,证明其仅由不可约表示支持,限制对称线性值到特定子空间,恢复Shapley值,并应用于联合国安理会和互补品市场。

摘要:

频繁情况下,具有众多玩家的游戏中Shapley值变得不可行。然而,建立对称性允许在多项式时间内进行计算。为了探讨这种减少,我们通过来自Young子群的诱导表示来识别同质组游戏的谱。然后我们证明此类游戏仅由不可约表示支持,通过Littlewood-Richardson规则,其中交互的深度严格受限于少数群体的大小。因此,游戏的代数结构过滤掉了一般核$W$的复杂性。我们然后展示这种过滤将任何对称线性值限制到特定子空间。这在$m=2$下通过标准公理唯一恢复Shapley值。最后,我们探讨联合国安理会和互补品市场等应用,以说明这种方法的实际威力。

英文摘要:

Oftentimes, the Shapley value, a measure of the contribution of a player to a game, becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of a homogeneous group game by using an induced representation from a Young subgroup. We prove that the depth of interaction of a two-group game is limited by the size of the minority group. Therefore, the algebraic structure of the game filters out a large space of irrelevant complexities. We then show that this filtration constrains any symmetric linear value to a specific subspace. This recovers the Shapley value uniquely for games consisting of exactly two homogeneous groups under standard axioms. Finally, we explore applications to the UN Security Council and complementary goods markets to illustrate the practical power of this approach.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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