半透明玩家：解释社会困境中的合作行为
Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas
摘要：
在过去的几十年里，无数的实验表明，人类并不总是为了最大限度地提高物质回报而行事。当不合作是主导策略（相对于物质回报）时，合作行为尤其令人困惑。在这里，我们提出了一种新的方法来解释合作，假设Halpern和通行证所谓的半透明的球员。通常，参与者被假设为不透明的，在这个意义上，一个参与者在正常形式的游戏中的偏差不会影响其他参与者使用的策略。但是一个参与者可能认为，如果他从一个策略切换到另一个策略，他选择切换的事实可能会被其他参与者看到。例如，如果他在囚徒困境中选择背叛，另一个参与者可能会感觉到他的内疚。我们表明，通过假设半透明的球员，我们可以恢复许多在人类行为中观察到的问题，如囚犯的困境，旅行者的困境，伯特兰竞争，和公共产品的游戏。
英文摘要：
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. But a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner's Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner's Dilemma, Traveler's Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
