基于合作对策论的反恐分析
Counter-terrorism analysis using cooperative game theory
摘要：
对策论已应用于许多研究领域，尤其是经济学和政治学。阿尔斯湾和Sandler（2005）使用非合作对策论（参与者是美国和欧盟）分析了反恐，该理论假设参与者之间的沟通是不允许的，或者，如果允许，那么就没有机制来执行参与者可能达成的任何协议。在非合作环境中，唯一的解决方案是纳什均衡，因为参与者只采取自我执行策略。在这里，我们用合作对策论来分析反恐，因为有办法在参与者之间进行沟通，并制定具有约束力的协议。事实上，反对恐怖主义的国家在经济和国际政治等许多方面都有着密切的联系。
英文摘要：
Game theory has been applied in many fields of study, especially economics and political science. Arce M. and Sandler (2005) analyzed counter-terrorism using non-cooperative game theory (the players are, for example, the US and the EU), which assumes that communication among the players is not allowed, or, if it is allowed, then there is no mechanism to enforce any agreement the players may make. The only solution in the non-cooperative setting would be a Nash equilibrium because the players adopt only self-enforcing strategies. Here we analyze counter-terrorism using cooperative game theory, because there are ways to communicate among the players and to make binding agreements; indeed, countries that oppose terrorism are closely connected to each other in many aspects such as economically and in terms of international politics.
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