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arXiv 2106.14654physics.soc-phcond-mat.stat-mechcs.GTphysics.app-ph
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一小部分选择性合作者可以显着提高整体幸福感

Small Fraction of Selective Cooperators Can Elevate General Wellbeing Significantly

Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki

摘要:

一个合作的参与者在事先不知道合作伙伴的意图的情况下将精力投入到共同的冒险中。但是,当玩家同时参与不同的游戏时,这种策略可以以各种方式实现。有趣的是,如果合作的球员区分他们的邻居,并分配到最成功的合作伙伴的游戏,然后一个显着的合作水平,可以达到即使在恶劣的情况下,游戏参数将决定完全叛逃,否则他们的外部投资。然而,当只有一小部分玩家在游戏中应用这种复杂的投资协议时,也可以达到这种积极的影响。为了证实这一假设,我们已经检查了几个分布,这些分布决定了应用上述选择性投资协议的支持参与者的比例。值得注意的是,当这些球员不是孤立的,但他们的影响渗透,那么整个人口可能会享受充分合作的好处已经在一个相对较低的值的协同因素,这代表了在应用公共产品游戏的困境强度。

英文摘要:

A cooperative player invests effort into a common venture without knowing the partner's intention in advance. But this strategy can be implemented in various ways when a player is involved in different games simultaneously. Interestingly, if cooperative players distinguish their neighbors and allocate all their external investments into the most successful partner's game exclusively then a significant cooperation level can be reached even at harsh circumstances where game parameters would dictate full defection otherwise. This positive impact, however, can also be reached when just a smaller fraction of players apply this sophisticated investment protocol during the game. To confirm this hypothesis we have checked several distributions that determine the fraction of supporting players who apply the mentioned selective investment protocol. Notably, when these players are not isolated, but their influences percolate then the whole population may enjoy the benefit of full cooperation already at a relatively low value of the synergy factor which represents the dilemma strength in the applied public goods game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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